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ABSTRACT
Taxpayers who underpay their taxes may be liable for accuracy-related penalties if the underpayment is attributable to negligence or the careless, reckless, or intentional disregard of rules or regulations. Understatements of tax
liability resulting from participation in certain types of tax avoidance transactions are also subject to penalties. Accuracy-related penalties may be imposed
even with respect to innocent mistakes if the discrepancy between a taxpayer's
correct and reported tax liability is sufficiently large.
Taxpayers may, however, avoid accuracy-related penalties by relying on a
reasonable cause defense. The reasonable cause defense may be satisfied by
relying on professional tax advice even if the advice concludes that the taxpayer's chance of prevailing on the underlying merits is uncertain, the advice
turns out to be incorrect, and the taxpayer is found liable for the underlying
tax. Reliance on professional tax advice is not, however, a fail-safe escape from
penalties. Courts have repeatedly held that taxpayers cannot rely on advisors "they know to be burdened with an inherent conflict of interest." But
courts have not clearly articulated the circumstances under which the common law conflict of interest rule applies, making its application unpredictable
and inconsistent.
A statutory conflict of interest rule now exists to prohibit taxpayers from
relying on advisors who participate in the organization, management, promotion, or sale of certain tax avoidance transactions. Tax advisors who are tax
return preparers may be subject to penalties, and those who provide written
tax advice are potentially subject to censure, monetary penalties, suspension,
or disbarment from practice before the Service for violating the covered opinion rules in Circular 230. These developments ostensibly enhance the quality
of written tax advice, which would lessen the import of the common law
conflict of interest rule and support its abrogation. This Article explains why
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the common law conflict of interest rule remains relevant despite these developments. This Article also proposes several regulatory changes to mitigate
advisor conflicts of interest.
After an introduction in Part I, Parts II through IV offer helpful background information to provide a context for the academic discussion that
occurs in the remainder of this Article. Readers familiar with the landscape of
tax opinions and accuracy-related penalties may wish to skip ahead to Part V.

I. Introduction
Taxpayers may be liable for accuracy-related penalties for underpaying their
federal income taxes due to negligence or the disregard of rules or regulations.
Taxpayers who engage in certain types of tax avoidance transactions that
result in an understatement of tax liability are also subject to accuracy-related
penalties. A taxpayer who is not negligent, considers all relevant rules and
regulations, and does not participate in tax avoidance transactions may nonetheless be subject to an accuracy-related penalty if the discrepancy between
the taxpayer's correct and reported tax liability is sufficiently large.
Taxpayers may, however, be able to avoid accuracy-related penalties by satisfying a reasonable cause and good faith exception, which requires a showing
that there is reasonable cause for the inaccuracy and that the taxpayer acted
in good faith despite the inaccuracy. Before 2004, there was one reasonable
cause exception for accuracy penalties imposed pursuant to section 6662.1
When Congress enacted section 6662A in 2004, it created an additional,
more stringent reasonable cause exception that applies specifically to penalties
imposed under section 6662A.
Both reasonable cause exceptions generally may be satisfied by relying on
a tax advisor who concludes that the taxpayer's chance of prevailing on the
underlying merits is uncertain, even though the advice turns out to be incorrect, and the taxpayer is found liable for the underlying tax. 2 As the Supreme
Court recognized in UnitedStates v. Boyle:
When an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law,
such as whether a liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on
that advice. Most taxpayers are not competent to discern error in the substantive advice of an accountant or attorney. To require the taxpayer to challenge the attorney, to seek a "second opinion," or to try to monitor counsel
on the provisions of the Code himself would nullify the very purpose of
seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first place.'

'Section references are to the 1986 Code, as amended, unless otherwise noted.
'Richard M. Lipton, Reasonable Cause and Good FaithReliance on an Advisor Help a Sonof-BOSS TaxpayerAvoid Penalties, 118 J. TAX'N 249, 254 (2013) (stating that "a taxpayer can
prevail on penalties even if the taxpayer's case on the merits is nearly meritless").
'United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985) (citing Haywood Lumber & Mining
Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 1950) (emphasis omitted)); see also Reg.

%51.6664-4(b)(1), -4(c)(2).
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Boyle "recognizes that technicalities of the Code are beyond the ken of the
average lay person, and that it is reasonable to rely on the advice of lawyers or accountants concerning such technicalities, even if the advice proves
incorrect."' One reason taxpayers hire advisors is to obtain expertise that taxpayers lack regarding complex, and in many cases, uncertain tax laws.'
Obtaining a tax opinion is not, however, a fail-safe escape from penalties.6
The reasonable cause exception that applies to section 6662A penalties prohibits taxpayers from relying on advisors who participate in the organization,
management, promotion, or sale of the transaction (the "statutory conflict
of interest rule"). The reasonable cause exception that applies to penalties
imposed under section 6662 does not itself prohibit advisors with conflicts
from helping taxpayers avoid penalties, but courts have repeatedly held that
taxpayers "cannot reasonably rely for professional advice on someone they
know to be burdened with an inherent conflict of interest" (the "common
law conflict of interest rule"). 7 Prohibiting reliance on a conflicted advisor
presumably helps to ensure that an advisor's relationships with nonclients or
the advisor's own personal interests do not cloud the advisor's judgment to
the point of providing the client biased and unreliable advice.
Courts have not clearly articulated the circumstances under which the
common law conflict of interest rule should apply. Consequently, application
of the common law conflict of interest rule is unpredictable and inconsistent,
resulting in both false positives (cases where the reasonable cause exception
was applied to permit taxpayers to avoid penalties when perhaps the exception should not have applied) and false negatives (cases where the reasonable
cause exception was found not to apply when perhaps it should). From a
policy perspective, false positives may be better than false negatives. False
negatives may hurt voluntary compliance to the extent that unpredictability
and inconsistency reinforce taxpayers' perception that the tax system itself is
unfairly administered. But false positives are detrimental as well because they
excuse taxpayers from paying penalties that otherwise should be imposed.
This Article disproves the hypothesis that the common law conflict of interest rule could be abrogated in light of the enactment of section 6662A and
the statutory conflict of interest rule as well as relatively recent enhancements
4

Allison v. United States, 2008-1 U.S.T.C.

5

50,209, 101 A.ET.R.2d 1028 (Fed. Cl. 2008).

As an illustration, consider that more than 57% of individual income tax returns filed in
2011 were prepared by paid tax preparers. INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., IRS PUBLICATION 4822,
TAXPAYER ATTRIBUTE FILING REPORT 2 (Jan. 2013). It is not unreasonable to think that the
numbers are even higher for corporate and partnership returns. See IRS ADVISORY COUNCIL,
SMALL BUsINEss/SELF EMPLOYED SUBGROUP REPORT 11 (Nov. 15, 2006).
6
Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (stating that "[r]eliance on ... the advice of a professional tax advisor . . . does not necessarily demonstrate reasonable cause and good faith").
7
Goldman v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Mortensen v. Commissioner, 440 E3d 375, 387 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that "[i]n order for reliance on professional tax advice to be reasonable . . . the advice must generally be from a competent and

independent advisor unburdened with a conflict of interest and not from promoters of the
investment").
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to the tax return preparer penalties under section 6694 and the covered opinion rules of Treasury Department Circular No. 230 (Circular 230). These
developments ostensibly help to enhance the quality of written tax advice,
which would lessen the import of the common law conflict of interest rule
and support its abrogation. Several weaknesses in these statutory and regulatory rules, however, prevent them from being an effective replacement for the
common law conflict of interest rule.
Part II of this Article describes the federal tax practice of rendering tax
opinions and in particular, the levels of confidence typically ascribed to written opinions. Parts III and IV, respectively, provide an overview of accuracyrelated penalties and describe the reasonable cause exceptions applicable to
accuracy-related penalties. Readers who are familiar with the landscape of
tax opinions and accuracy-related penalties may wish to skip ahead to Part
V. Part V discusses the potential for advisor bias and the unpredictability
of the common law conflict of interest rule that applies to accuracy-related
penalties imposed under section 6662. Part VI provides a critique of section 6662A and the statutory conflict of interest rule, the tax return preparer
penalties under section 6694, and the covered opinion rules of Circular 230,
and concludes that each of these legislative and regulatory developments have
shortcomings, creating a patchwork of provisions that stop short of creating
an effective system that enhances the quality of written tax advice. Part VII of
this Article recommends regulatory changes that would put the onus on tax
advisors to guard against potential conflicts of interest.

II. Tax Opinion Confidence Levels
Taxpayers ordinarily seek to avoid accuracy penalties by relying on a written tax opinion from a professional advisor such as a tax lawyer or accountant.' A typical opinion will evaluate the available legal authorities and assess
the strength of the taxpayer's reporting position using one of several commonly understood confidence levels, some of which are set forth in the Code
itself or in the Treasury regulations.
Section 6662(d)(2)(B) provides a statutory exception from substantial
understatement penalties with respect to non-tax shelter transactions (the
"Substantial Authority Exception").' The exception works by reducing the
amount of an understatement, and the substantial understatement penalty
applies only if the amount of the understatement exceeds a minimum threshold."o To avoid accuracy-related penalties with respect to non-tax shelter
transactions that are disclosed to the Service, taxpayers need only a reasonable
Stobie Creek Invs. v. United States, 2008-2 U.S.T.C. 5 50,471, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 5442 (Fed.
Cl. 2008) ("[T] he concept of reliance on the advice of professionals is a hallmark of the exception for reasonable cause and good faith."); David Weisbach & Brian Gale, The Regulation of
TaxAdvice andAdvisors, 130 TAx NOTES (TA) 1279, 1287 (Mar. 14, 2011) (stating that "[o]ne
of the central benefits of obtaining an opinion is to protect against the possibility of penalties").
9
1.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (this exception is not applicable to tax shelter transactions).
8

1o§ 6662(d)(2)(B).
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basis for the position." For non-tax shelter transactions that are not properly disclosed, a taxpayer needs to have substantial authority for the position
reported on a tax return. 2 The substantial authority standard "is an objective
standard" that "is less stringent than the more likely than not standard ...
but more stringent than the reasonable basis standard."13 Thus, a lower level
of confidence is acceptable if the taxpayer draws the Service's attention to the
transaction." "More likely than not" means a greater than 50% likelihood
that the position would be upheld were it to be challenged by the Service.15
"Reasonable basis" is defined in the regulations to mean "significantly higher
than not frivolous or not patently improper."'" "Reasonable basis" and "substantial authority" are commonly understood to mean confidence levels of
20% and 40%, respectively.' Even taxpayers who cannot muster a reasonable
basis for the position may nevertheless be able to avoid accuracy penalties
imposed by section 6662 by satisfying the reasonable cause and good faith
defense, which requires no particular level of confidence for non-tax shelter
transactions.' 8
The only way for taxpayers who engage in tax motivated transactions to
avoid accuracy-related penalties is by satisfying the reasonable cause and good
faith defense." Any taxpayer who engages in a listed transaction or a reportable avoidance transaction within the meaning of section 6662A (transactions
with a significant purpose of tax avoidance or evasion and certain characteristics that require them to be disclosed to the Service) qualifies for the reasonable cause defense only by having substantial authority for the position and a
reasonable belief that the position was more likely than not the proper treatment at the time the return was filed. 2 0
The Treasury regulations apply these same standards to corporate taxpayers
who engage in tax shelters, which are transactions with a significant purpose
"§ 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii).

6662(d)(2)(B)(i).
' 3Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2).
"'See Recent ProposedStatutory Changes to Return PreparerRules of Internal Revenue Code
Section 6694 andRelated Issues, N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N TAx SECTION, Jan. 28, 2008, http://old.
nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/ 1146Report.pdf (letter
discussing the recent and proposed statutory changes to tax return preparer penalties).
' 5Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2).
16 Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).
12§

7

1 JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, COMPARISON OF JOINT COMM. STAFF AND TREASURY RECOMMENDATIONs RELATING TO PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE 13 (Nov. 5, 1999).
8
4

' I.R.C. § 666 (c).

OThe exception in section 6662(d)(2)(B) does not apply to tax shelters. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)
(2)(C); supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. Although a taxpayer engaged in a tax shelter
can no longer avoid accuracy penalties by having substantial authority or by disclosing the
transaction and having a reasonable basis, those taxpayers may nonetheless qualify for the
reasonable cause and good faith exception. Notice 2005-12, 2005-1 C.B. 494.
20§ 6664(d)(3)(B), (C). See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text for discussion of
reportable transactions.
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of tax avoidance. 21 Pursuant to this special rule, a corporate taxpayer that
engages in a nonreportable transaction with a significant tax avoidance purpose and wishes to rely on the merits of the underlying position to support a
reasonable cause defense has to, at a minimum, show that there is substantial
authority for the taxpayer's tax treatment and that the taxpayer reasonably
believes that the tax treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment at the time the return was filed (the "Legal Justification Test"). 22 The
reasonable belief requirement may be satisfied by reliance on a "more likely
than not" tax opinion. 23 Failing to satisfy these minimum requirements will
preclude a corporate taxpayer from using its legal justification to meet the
reasonable cause and good faith exception. 24
The Service has taken the position in nonbinding guidance that "noncorporate taxpayers must also satisfy the more demanding standards for the
reasonable cause and good faith exception in Regulation section 1.6664-4(f)
with respect to tax shelter items. 25 There is a reasonable argument that the
Legal Justification Test in Regulation section 1.6664-4(f)(2) should apply
to tax shelters of noncorporate taxpayers. Until December 8, 1994, corporate taxpayers could exclude understatements attributable to a tax shelter by
relying on the Substantial Authority Exception. 26 Treasury adopted the Legal
Justification Test in 1995 after Congress eliminated the Substantial Authority
Exception for corporations.27 Treasury interpreted Congress's repeal of the
Substantial Authority Exception for corporations to mean that a harsher
regime should apply to corporate tax shelters. 28 Presumably, that same rationale would extend to noncorporate taxpayers after Congress eliminated the
Substantial Authority Exception in 2004 for noncorporate taxpayers engaged

21

Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(2).
Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(2). After the enactment of section 6662A, this rule in effect applies
only to nonreportable significant purpose transactions. See I.R.C. %§6664(d)(1), 6662A(b)
(2)(B) (stating that section 6662A applies to "any reportable transaction (other than a listed
transaction) if a significant purpose of such transaction is the avoidance or evasion of Federal
income tax"). Satisfying the Legal Justification Test is a necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, requirement of the reasonable cause defense. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(3).
23
Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(2)(i)(B)(2).
24
Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(2)(i).
22

2

1INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., VARIABLE PREPAID FORWARD CONTRACTS INCORPORATING
LENDING ARRANGEMENTS UIL: 1001.00-00, 2008 WIL 852615 (Feb. 6, 2008). Coor-

SHARE

dinated issue papers are not binding authority; like revenue rulings, they merely state the
Service's position. Tarpot Admin. Servs. v. Commissioner, 133 TC. 202, 224 n.18 (2009).
26
1.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (1994).
27
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 744, 108 Stat. 4809, 5011
(1994); T.D. 8617, 1995-2 C.B. 274.
28
See T.D. 8617, supra note 27 ("Treasury and the IRS continue to believe that the regulations, including the authority requirement, properly implement the statute and Congressional
intent.").
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in tax shelters. 2 9 But the Legal Justification Test regulations, having last been
amended in 2003, do not apply to noncorporate taxpayers. 30
Thus, all significant purpose transactions of corporate taxpayers, whether
or not they are reportable, require a more likely than not confidence level
to avoid penalties. In contrast, noncorporate taxpayers engaged in tax motivated transactions that are not reportable or listed transactions, and thus not
subject to section 6662A penalties, can satisfy the reasonable cause and good
faith defense without having any particular level of confidence.
Although the highest level of opinion discussed in the Treasury regulations
is a "more likely than not" opinion; "will" and "should" opinions are also
commonly rendered. 31 Practitioners typically peg "will" opinions at about a
90% certainty that the intended tax consequences would be sustained if challenged by the Service and "should" opinions at somewhere between a 70% to
90% likelihood. 32 These confidence levels can be set forth in a hierarchy from
strongest to weakest as follows: will (90% or greater confidence level); should
(70%-90%); more likely than not (more than 50%); substantial authority (40%-50%); reasonable basis (20%); and not frivolous or not patently
improper. 33 "Will" opinions usually are limited to straightforward legal issues
because they provide assurance at almost near certainty. 34 As noted by one
commentator, "[t] here is a fairly wide range of transactions in which an advisor easily reaches 'more likely than not,' and equally easily concludes that he
will not get to 'will,' leaving him to think long and hard about whether he can
make the jump to 'should."' 35 More generally, it is worth emphasizing that
29
1.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(i) (2003), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 812, 118 Stat.
1418, 1577-80 (2004); see also Weisbach & Gale, supra note 8, at 1289 n.63 (noting that the
reasonable cause regulations make a distinction between corporate and noncorporate taxpayers
that no longer exists in the Code).
30
TD. 9109, 68 Fed. Reg. 75126 (Dec. 30, 2003).
31
Reg. § 1.6662-4(d) (2); see also Weisbach & Gale, supra note 8, at 1284.
32
Robert Rothman, The Least Fun Part of the Job or a Tax Lauyer'r Guide to Acquisition
Agreements, 55 TAx LAw. 711, 744 (2002) ("[B]y convention a 'will' opinion represents the
lawyer's professional judgment that there is no risk of any other characterization."); Jasper L.
Cummings, Jr., The Range of Legal Tax Opinions, with Emphasis on the 'Should' Opinion, 98
TAx NOTES (TA) 1125, 1129, 1132 (Feb. 19, 2003) (noting the "'will' opinion is the clean or
unqualified opinion of near certainty, or as certain as things can be in the tax world," and that
a "should" opinion conveys a certainty of between 70% and 90%); see also Weisbach & Gale,
supra note 8, at 744 ("[B]y convention the 'should' opinion represents a professional judgment
that concludes, with a fairly high degree of confidence, that certain consequences will ensue,
but which acknowledges some degree of uncertainty with respect to that conclusion.").
33

1he former regulations relating to tax preparer penalties contained an additional con-

fidence level, a "realistic possibility of success," which was defined to mean "a one in three,
or greater, likelihood of being sustained on the merits." Reg. § 1.6694-2(b) (2007) (current
version at Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)); see also ABA COMM. ON ETHIcs & PROF 'L REsPONSIBILITY,
FoRMAL Op. 85-352 (1985) (permitting a lawyer to advise a clieit with respect to a tax return
position provided there is "some realistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated").
34
Robert P. Rothman, Tax Opinion Practice, 64 TAX LAw. 301, 312 (2011) (stating that
"will" opinions are "often easy to give" because they involve "no troublesome legal issues").
35
1Id. at 313.
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the mathematical precision of these confidence levels may not be reflected in
the legal authorities, which to the extent they exist, are sometimes vague and
ambiguous, or even contradictory. 6

III. Overview of Accuracy-Related Penalties
A. Civil Tax PenaltiesAs Tools to Promote Voluntary Compliance
The U.S. tax system is known as a self-assessment system because taxpayers
are required to calculate their tax liabilities, file their tax returns, and pay their
taxes without direct intervention or enforcement by the Service." The success of our self-assessment system necessarily depends on taxpayers' voluntary
compliance with the legal duties imposed upon them. The Service estimates
that approximately 83% of taxpayers correctly calculate and timely file and
pay the taxes they owe voluntarily without compulsion from the Service. 38
The legal and economics literatures generally accept the view that civil tax
penalties are intended to promote voluntary compliance, although how penalties actually do so is subject to debate. 39 Under a deterrence theory of tax
compliance, civil tax penalties encourage taxpayers to compute their taxes
accurately and to make timely payment of those taxes, thereby promoting
voluntarily compliance in a self-assessment system by making noncompliance
more costly.40 A deterrence theory of tax compliance posits that taxpayers will
comply with the tax laws when the expected cost of noncompliance exceeds

1

6

Id. at 311.

37

INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 6 (Aug. 2, 2007) [hereinafter IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE];

see, e.g., Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 191 (1976) (quoting Flora v. United States,
362 U.S. 145, 176 (1960)) ("Our income tax system is primarily a self-reporting and self-

assessment one. It is 'based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distraint."').
"IRS Releases New Tax Gap Estimates; Compliance Rates Remain Statistically Unchanged
From Previous Study, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Jan. 6, 2012, http://www.irs.gov/uac/
IRS-Releases-New-Tax-Gap-Estimates;-Compliance-Rates-Remain-Statistically-UnchangedFrom-Previous-Study. The voluntary compliance rate, which is the amount of taxes paid voluntarily and timely, expressed as a percentage of total taxes that the Service estimates should
have been paid, is estimated to be 83.1%. IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE, supra note 37,
at 18. The 16.9% comprises noncompliant taxpayers who do not file required returns, underreport their income, or fail to timely pay the taxes they owe. Tax Gap Map, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, Dec. 2011, http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax-gap-map_2006.pdf The 16.9%
of noncompliance translates into an estimated $450.0 billion of taxes that are legally imposed

but are not voluntarily and timely paid. Id.
39
Michael Doran, Tax Penaltiesand Tax Compliance, 46 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 111-12
(2009).
4
0Id. at 112; see also OFFIcE OF TAX POL'Y, DEPT OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
[hereinafter 1999 REPORT] ("The fundamental objective [of penalties] should be to

18 (1999)

foster and
enhance the high degree of voluntary compliance that presently exists among the taxpaying
public without undue burden or complexity.").
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 67, No. 3
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the cost of compliance. The expected cost of noncompliance would consist
of the taxes, penalties, and interest that would be owed if the taxpayer did
not comply. But the cost of noncompliance must be discounted by the risk
that the Service will actually detect the noncompliance.4 2 For fiscal year 2012
(October 2011-September 2012), only about 1% of all individual income
tax returns, 1.6% of all C corporation returns, and 17.8% of large corporate
returns were audited. 43 Given the low audit rates, a deterrence model fails to
justify fully the role of penalties as a mechanism to promote voluntary compliance because, economically at least, there is no incentive for taxpayers to
comply."
Penalties also may encourage voluntary compliance by reinforcing norms.
A norms model explains taxpayers' compliance with the tax laws by reference
to personal and social norms, including reciprocal cooperation and trust.45
Under a norms model, taxpayers comply with the tax laws because they
assume or perceive others to be in compliance. The imposition of penalties
encourages law-abiding taxpayers to remain compliant by assuring them that
those who do not comply will be penalized. Without the threat of penalties,
otherwise compliant taxpayers may stop complying once they start to feel
duped by actually paying the taxes they owe while others fail to meet their tax
reporting or payment obligations.48 Additionally, imposing penalties under a
norms model is intended to punish those who fail to follow tax-compliance

41

Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A TheoreticalAnalysis, 1 J.

PUB. EcoN. 323, 325-26 (1972).
421d
43

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK, EXAMINATION COVERAGE: RECOMMENDED
AND AVERAGE RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL TAx AFTER EXAMINATION, BY TYPE AND SIZE OF
RETURN, FIscAL YEAR 2012, TABLE 9A (2012). The chances of being audited increase notice-

ably for individuals with adjusted gross income above $1.0 million. Id. at 26 (Table 9b). Like-

wise, larger corporations have a greater chance of being audited, and almost all of the largest
corporations are audited. Id. at 22.
4Consider as an example an individual who owes $10,000 of taxes and assume a penalty
rate of 20% and a detection rate of 1%. Ignoring interest owed on the underpayment, the
expected economic cost of noncompliance is only $120 ($10,000 in taxes and $2,000 in penalties owed if caught x 1% detection rate) whereas the cost of complying is the $10,000 of tax
that is legally due. A deterrence theory says that this taxpayer will not pay the $10,000 of taxes
owing because the expected cost of noncompliance is only $120.
45
Doran, supra note 39, at 131.

46Id.
4.; see also

INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., IRS PENALTY HANDBOOK, 20.1.1.2.1(7) (stating that "[p]enalties support voluntary compliance by assuring compliant taxpayers that tax

offenders are identified and penalized").
"See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Book-tax Conformity and the CorporateTax Shelter Debate:Assessing the ProposedSection 475 Mark-to-Market Safe Harbor,24 VA. TAX REv. 301, 371 (2004)
(stating that taxpayers in a voluntary compliance system "are more likely to comply if they
believe that the tax system is fairly and consistently applied across taxpayers").
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 67, No. 3
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norms.4 Imposing penalties for noncompliance emphasizes the fairness of
the tax system, which also encourages voluntary compliance.5 0
How penalties affect voluntary compliance is not certain because their
effects have generally not been quantitatively measured." Whatever the justifications for civil tax penalties or their effectiveness in promoting voluntary
compliance, they are well entrenched in our federal tax system, having been a
part of federal tax law since the Civil War.52

B. Summary ofAccuracy-Related Penalties
By one count, there are over 130 different civil tax penalty provisions in the
Code.53 This Article is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of all
the penalty provisions. Instead, because the focus of this Article is on the reasonable cause and good faith exceptions applicable to accuracy-related penalties, this section of the Article provides a summary of the accuracy-related
penalties to which the reasonable cause exceptions apply.

1. Section 6662 Accuracy-Related Penalties
Section 6662 imposes an accuracy-related penalty on underpayments of
tax attributable to certain types of misconduct, including negligence or disregard of rules or regulations and transactions found to be lacking economic
substance." An accuracy-related penalty may apply even if the taxpayer is not
negligent and considers all rules and regulations if there is an understatement
of income tax that is sufficiently large, or in the words of the Code, "substantial." The term "understatement" generally means the excess of the correct tax
liability over the liability shown on the return reduced by any rebates." For
corporations other than S corporations and personal holding companies, an
understatement of income tax is substantial if the understatement exceeds the
lesser of (1) ten percent of the tax liability required to be shown on the return
for the taxable year, or if greater, $10,000, or (2) $10.0 million." For all other
taxpayers, an understatement is substantial if it exceeds the greater of (1) ten
49
Doran, supra note 39, at 133 (stating that "the norms model assumes that certain taxpayers will not follow tax-compliance norms, and those taxpayers must be deterred by the threat

of legal sanctions").
50

n his article, Professor Doran offers a third role for tax penalties, which is to define tax
compliance. Id.
"See 1999 REPORT, supra note 40, at 39 (noting that the government has insufficient data
to determine the effectiveness of penalties but stating nonetheless that "the overall evidence
suggests that penalties and audits have positive effects on compliance").
52
Id at 19.
53
NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, vol. 2, 7 (2008).
54
I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1)-(3). Section 6662 applies to other types of misconduct in addition to
those just mentioned. See § 6662(b)(4)-(5), (7). This Article does not discuss those provisions
because they generally do not arise in cases analyzing the common law conflict of interest rule.
"5§ 6662(d)(2)(A).
565 6662(d)(1)(B).

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 67, No. 3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3437851

DYSFUNCTION JUNCTION

413

percent of the correct tax required to be shown on the return or (2) $5,000.57
A penalty also applies to underpayments attributable to substantial valuation misstatements, which exist when the value or adjusted basis of property
claimed on a return is 150% or more of the correct amount.5 8
The amount of the penalty is equal to 20% of the underpayment of tax. 9
The penalty rate increases to 40% of understatements attributable to gross
valuation misstatements within the meaning of section 6662(h) and undisclosed noneconomic substance transactions within the meaning of section
6662(i).6 0 While an underpayment may be attributable to more than one
kind of misconduct, there is no stacking or accumulation of penalties. Thus,
the maximum accuracy-related penalty that may be imposed is 20% (or 40%
in the case of gross misconduct) even if an underpayment is attributable to
more than one type of misconduct or overstatement.6'
2. Section 6662A Penaltieson Reportable Transaction Understatements
In 2004, as a reaction to the tax shelter heyday of the late 1990s and
early 2000s, Congress enacted section 6662A to deter taxpayers from entering into tax avoidance transactions.62 Section 6662A created a new penalty
for understatements of tax attributable to (1) "any listed transaction" or (2)
"any reportable transaction .

.

. if a significant purpose of such transaction

is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax" (reportable avoidance
transactions).6 3 Participation in reportable transactions must be reported to
the Service because these types of transactions are abusive or have the potential for abuse."' Reportable transactions include: (1) listed transactions, which
are transactions that the Service has identified as abusive pursuant to section
6011; (2) transactions with contractual protection that permits the taxpayer
to receive a refund of fees paid to advisors if the intended tax treatment is
not sustained or where the fees are contingent on receipt of the intended
tax benefits; (3) confidential transactions, which involve advisors who prohibit their clients from disclosing the tax treatment or structure to protect
the confidentiality of the advisors' tax strategies;65 (4) transactions resulting

5

6662(d)(1)(A).
5

6662(e)(1)(A).

5%6662(a), 6664(a).
6A gross valuation misstatement exists when the value or adjusted basis of property claimed
on a return is 200% or more of the correct amount. § 6662(h)(2)(A)(i). Additionally, a 40%
penalty rate applies if the correct value or adjusted basis of property is zero but some other
value or adjusted basis is claimed on a return. Reg. § 1.6 6 6 2-5(g).
6'Reg.
§ 1.6662-2(c).
62
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 108TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAx LEGISLATION IN THE 108TH CONGRESS 364 (Joint Comm. Print 2005).
63
1.R.C. § 6662A(b)(2).
6§
6662A(d) (referring to section 6707A(c), which refers to section 6011).
65
A transaction is a reportable loss transaction only if the advisor is paid at least $250,000
for a corporate taxpayer or $50,000 in all other cases. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3)(iii).
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in large tax losses being claimed;"6 and (5) transactions of interest, which are
transactions the Service has identified as potentially abusive but for which the
Service lacks sufficient information to determine whether the transactions
should be listed.
The section 6662A penalty is calculated by multiplying the penalty rate
times the base. The penalty rate is generally 20% of any reportable transaction understatement, but increases to 30% if the transaction is not disclosed." Public entities have to disclose payment of the 30% penalty to the
Securities and Exchange Commission.6 9 Unlike the accuracy-related penalty
in section 6662, which is computed based on the net amount of tax owing,
the section 6662A penalty is computed based on the net increase in taxable
income resulting from the difference between the proper tax treatment and
the taxpayer's treatment of the item as shown on the return. 70

IV. Reasonable Cause and Good Faith Exceptions to
Accuracy-Related Penalties
A. Backgroundand Scope ofthe Reasonable Cause and Good FaithExceptions
Taxpayers may avoid accuracy penalties, other than those stemming from
transactions lacking economic substance, by satisfying a reasonable cause
and good faith exception, which requires a showing that there is reasonable
cause for the inaccuracy and that the taxpayer acted in good faith despite
the inaccuracy.71 The reasonable cause and good faith exception is the only
way to avoid accuracy-related penalties imposed under section 6662A, as

"Loss transactions that must be reported include those generating at least $2.0 million of
section 165 loss for an individual in any tax year or $4.0 million in the year the transaction is
entered into and the succeeding five taxable years. Reg. %§1.6011-4(b)(5)(i)(D), -(4)(b)(5)(ii).
For corporations, the amount of loss is at least $10.0 million or at least $20.0 million over the
same combination of years set forth in the previous sentence. Reg. %§1.6011-4(b)(5)(i) (A),
-(4)(b)(5)(ii)
67

Reg. § 1.6011-4(b).
61§ 6662A(c). Section 6662A(c) refers to the disclosure requirement in section 6664(d)
(2)(A). Id. Section 6664(d) has been amended since the enactment of section 6662A.
See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§ 1409(c)(2)(A)-(C), 124 Stat. 1029, 1069-70. The disclosure requirement is now in section
6664(d)(3)(A). Id.
6 I.R.C. § 6707A(e)(2)(B);
Rev. Proc. 2005-51, 2005-2 C.B. 296.
70%
6662A(b). The base for the section 6662A penalty is the "reportable transaction understatement," which is the sum of two different calculations. § 6662A(b)(1). The first calculation
is the product of increases in taxable income due to improper treatment of an item and the
highest rate of appropriate tax applicable to the taxpayer. § 6662A(b)(1)(A). The second calculation isthe amount of decrease in the total amount of tax credits stemming from the taxpayer's
treatment of the section 6662A item and the proper treatment of such item. § 6662A(b)(1)(B).
71
1.R.C. § 666 4 (c)(2), (d)(2) (no reasonable cause exception for transactions found to lack
economic substance).
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well as for penalties attributable to tax shelter transactions. 72 The term "tax
shelter" means "a partnership or other entity, an investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement if a significant purpose of such partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal
income tax." 73
The reasonable cause and good faith exception recognizes that taxpayers
who undertake efforts to determine their proper tax liability should not be
penalized for getting it wrong.74 Before 2004, there was one reasonable cause
exception for accuracy penalties.75 But when Congress enacted section 6662A,
it created a new, more stringent reasonable cause exception that applies specifically to penalties imposed under section 6662A.

B. Reasonable Cause and Good Faith Exception to Section 6662A Penalties
The heightened reasonable cause exception, which applies to penalties
imposed under section 6662A relating to listed transactions and reportable
avoidance transactions, is available only if three requirements are satisfied."6
First, the taxpayer must disclose to the Service, pursuant to section 6011, the
facts concerning the transaction's treatment." Failing to disclose a transaction
subject to section 6662A results in a strict liability penalty because the reasonable cause exception is unavailable if there is no disclosure and the reasonable
cause exception is the only way to avoid the imposition of section 6662A penalties." Second, there must be substantial authority for the taxpayer's treatment of the transaction, which involves an objective evaluation of the legal

72§ 6664(d). See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text discussing the "substantial author-

ity exception" that may be used to avoid accuracy-related penalties relating to transactions that
are not tax shelters.
73I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii).
74
David T. Moldenhauer, Penalty Protection Opinions and Advisor Conflicts of Interest, 27
AKRON TAX J. 55, 61 (2012).
"The reasonable cause and good faith exception was incorporated in section 6664 in 1989
as part of the Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act and was made applicable to all accuracy-related penalties that existed at the time of enactment. Improved Penalty
Administration and Compliance Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6664, 103 Stat. 2106, 2398
(1989); see also Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 323,
96 Stat. 324, 613-15 (repealed 1989) (providing that "[tihe Secretary may waive all or any
part of the addition to tax provided by this section on a showing by the taxpayer that there
was reasonable cause for the understatement (or part thereof) and that the taxpayer acted in
good faith").
76§ 6664(d)(3); see supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text for definitions of listed transactions and reportable avoidance transactions.
77§ 6664(d)(3)(A). To satisfy the disclosure requirement, taxpayers must attach a completed
Form 8886 (Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement) to the return that reflects the transaction. Reg. § 1.6011-4(d); Notice 2005-12, supra note 19.
78
H.R. REP. No. 108-548, pt. 1, at 263-64 (2004) (stating that "[i]f the taxpayer does not
adequately disclose the transaction, the strengthened reasonable cause exception is not available (i.e., a strict-liability penalty applies)").
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authorities." Third, the taxpayer must reasonably believe its treatment was
more likely than not the correct treatment. 0 A taxpayer's reasonable belief
may be founded on a more likely than not opinion from a professional advisor provided the advice is not a "disqualified opinion" and is not from a
"disqualified tax advisor."" Disqualified opinions are those based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions or unreasonable representations provided
by the taxpayer or other individuals.8 2 Disqualified opinions can also include
opinions that do not identify and consider all the pertinent facts of a transaction or any other requirement that Treasury may prescribe."
The Code defines the term "disqualified tax advisor" using four characteristics-any of which will cause the advisor to be a disqualified tax advisor."
The first situation is an advisor who derives more than $50,000 for advising a
natural person or more than $250,000 in all other cases (a "material advisor")
who participates in the organization, management, promotion, or sale of the
transaction or is related to any person who so participates." The fee thresholds
are reduced to $25,000 for corporations and $10,000 for all other taxpayers
who engage in listed transactions." The second type of disqualified advisor is
one who is directly or indirectly paid by a material advisor with respect to a
transaction.8 7 A disqualified advisor can also include an advisor whose fee is
contingent on "all or part of the intended tax benefits from the transaction
being sustained." 8 Last, a disqualified advisor is one who has a disqualifying
financial interest in the transaction as posited by Treasury Department regulations.89 Treasury has not proposed any applicable regulations.
Section 6662A may apply if a transaction that is not listed at the time a
return is filed reporting the consequences of the transaction later becomes

79

Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i); see text accompanying note 13 for definition of substantial
authority.
80§
81§

6664(d)(3)(C).

6664(d)(4)(B)(i). A more likely than not opinion is one concluding that the position on
the return will be sustained on the merits at a likelihood of more than 50%.
82§ 6664(d)(4)(B)(iii)(I)-(I).
83§ 6664(d)(4)(B)(iii)(I)-(I).
84§ 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii).
85§ 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii)(I). The Service issued Notice 2005-12
to provide interim guidance as
to when a material advisor is considered to organize, manage, promote, or sell a transaction
within the meaning of section 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii)(I). Notice 2005-12, supra note 19.
" 8Notice 2005-12, supra note 19 (stating that the fee amounts applicable to listed transactions under Regulation section 301.6112-1(c)(3)(ii) apply); see TD. 9046, 2003-1 C.B. 614,
prior to amendment by TD. 9352, 2007-2 C.B. 621.
87§ 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii)(II).
88§ 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii)(III). Since 2008, Circular 230 has prohibited contingent fee arrangements for tax planning and advice, including the rendering of written tax advice. 31 C.ER.
§ 10.27 (2011).
89§ 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii)(IV).
90

Notice 2005-12 provides interim guidance with respect to certain kinds of disqualifying
compensation arrangements. Notice 2005-12, supra note 19.
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listed while the statute of limitations on assessment is still open. ' In such
cases, the tax advisor could retroactively become disqualified, which would
prohibit the taxpayer from relying on the reasonable cause exception applicable to section 6662A penalties.92
C. Exception to Section 6662 Penalties
The reasonable cause exception in section 6 66 4 (c) applies to transactions
that are not covered by section 6662A, including: (1) nonreportable, nonsignificant purpose transactions; (2) reportable transactions, other than listed
transactions, with no significant avoidance purpose; and (3) nonreportable
transactions that nonetheless have a significant purpose of tax avoidance."
The decision of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good
faith is made by taking into account all the relevant facts and circumstances.
The most important factor is the taxpayers' efforts to ensure their correct tax
liability." Other facts and circumstances that may be relevant in determining whether reasonable cause and good faith exist include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all the facts and
circumstances as well as the taxpayer's education, knowledge, and business
experience.9' Reasonable cause requires the taxpayer to exercise "ordinary
business care and prudence."9 7
What factors constitute reasonable cause is a legal question." Whether
those factors are present in a given case (i.e., whether a taxpayer has reasonable cause for a tax underpayment) is a factual question." Because it is a
question of fact, a trial court's decision regarding whether or not reasonable
cause exists may be reversed only if there is a "definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed."'o The Service's determination regarding
reasonable cause is reviewed de novo by the trial court.'0 '
Like the reasonable cause exception attributable to section 6662A penalties, the section 6 66 4 (c) reasonable cause exception attributable to section
9'See Reg. § 1.6 011- 4 (e)(2)(i).
9'2 Alan W Granwell & David D. Sherwood, Accuracy-Related and FraudPenalties After
Enactment of the American jobs CreationAct of2004, FED. B.A. SEC. TAX'N REP. 19, 20 n.3
(2005).

93No penalty will apply even if a transaction is reportable so long as there is no significant
tax avoidance purpose and the taxpayer discloses the relevant facts relating to the position and
can show a reasonable basis for the position. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii).
94
Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 TC. 438, 448 (2001); Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1).
9
'Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1).
96

1d.
'Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 TC. 43, 98 (2000) (citing United States

9

v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985)).
98
Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 E3d 471, 483-84 (7th Cir. 2009).
99.
'Id.
0

at 4 83 (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).

' Murfam Farms, LLC ex rel. Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 245 (Fed. Cl.
2010).
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6662 penalties may be satisfied by relying on a tax advisor even if the advice
in hindsight turns out to be incorrect and the taxpayer is found to be liable
for the underlying tax. For purposes of section 6664(c), the advisor has to be
competent and reliance has to be reasonable in light of the circumstances.1 02
A taxpayer's education, sophistication, and business background are taken
into account to determine whether reliance is reasonable.' 0 3 The Tax Court
has said that a taxpayer must satisfy the following three-part test to possibly avoid accuracy-related penalties under section 6662 by relying on a tax
advisor: "(1) The advisor was a competent professional who had sufficient
expertise to justify reliance, (2) the taxpayer provided necessary and accurate
information to the advisor, and (3) the taxpayer actually relied in good faith
on the advisor's judgment."'o 4 The regulations also require that the tax advice
(1) be grounded on all relevant facts and the law that pertains to those facts
and (2) not rely on unreasonable or inaccurate factual or legal assumptions or
unreasonable representations.'0
D. A Comparison of the Two Reasonable Cause Exceptions
The reasonable cause exception in section 6664(c) is more lenient than the
section 6664(d) exception applicable to section 6662A penalties in at least
three ways. First, disclosure of the transaction is not required to qualify for
the section 6664(c) exception.'0o Second, except for corporate taxpayers who
engage in tax shelters, taxpayers generally may satisfy the section 6664(c)
reasonable cause exception without having substantial authority for the position and without believing that the position is more likely than not correct. 0 7 Third, unlike the more stringent reasonable cause exception in section
6664(d), which categorically prohibits reliance on conflicted advisors, section
666 4 (c) does not itself require taxpayers to rely on disinterested advisors.

02

' Am. Boat, 583 E3d at 481; Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1).
Reg. § 1.666 4 -4 (c)(1).
'"Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43, 98-99 (2000).
05
' Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1).
106Compare I.R.C. § 6664(c)(3), with § 6664(d)(3)(A). But even under the more lenient
reasonable cause exception, failing to disclose a reportable transaction "is a strong indication
that the taxpayer did not act in good faith with respect to the portion of the underpayment
attributable to the reportable transaction." Reg. § 1.6664-4(d).
107Compare I.R.C. § 6664(c)(3), with § 6664(d)(3)(B), (C). Circular 230, however, requires
the inclusion of a disclaimer that a covered opinion cannot be used for penalty protection
if a more likely than not level of confidence cannot be reached. 31 C.ER. § 10.35(e)(4)(ii)
(2011). This glitch arises because the Legal Justification Test applies only to corporate taxpayers
whereas the covered opinion rules do not distinguish among types of taxpayers. See supra notes
22-24 and accompanying text for discussion of Legal Justification Test.
03
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V. Common Law Conflict of Interest Rule
A. Introduction andBackground
Although the more lenient reasonable cause exception in section 6664(c)
does not itself statutorily require independent advisors to avoid penalties,
courts have repeatedly held that taxpayers "cannot reasonably rely for professional advice on someone they know to be burdened with an inherent conflict of interest."'os Thus, unlike the per se prohibition that applies to section
6662A penalties, whether advice from an advisor with a conflict of interest
would make reliance on the advice unreasonable under the more lenient reasonable cause exception should depend on all the facts and circumstances.' 0
One of the early cases applying this common law conflict of interest rule
is Goldman v. Commissioner."o In Goldman, an individual taxpayer claimed
losses on his 1981 and 1982 tax returns."' The losses claimed were approximately 400% more than the amount of cash he invested in a limited partnership formed to invest in oil and gas exploration.112 The Service disallowed
the losses claimed and imposed a negligence penalty."' The taxpayer sought
to avoid the penalty by arguing reliance on a tax advisor's evaluation of the
investment."
The Second Circuit acknowledged that reliance on professional advice may
provide a reasonable cause defense but noted that "such reliance must be
objectively reasonable."' 15 Here, reliance on the advisor was not objectively
reasonable because the investor knew that the advisor had an "inherent conflict of interest" due to the advisor's role as the limited partnership's sales representative." 6 The investor knew or should have known of the advisor's role
because he was identified as the partnership's sales representative on the subscription agreement and the limited partnership agreement, both of which
the taxpayer signed.' '"

LosGoldman v. Commissioner, 39 E3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Mortensen v. Commissioner, 440 E3d 375, 387 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that "[i]n order for reliance on professional tax advice to be reasonable ... the advice must generally be from a competent and
independent advisor unburdened with a conflict of interest and not from promoters of the
investment").
9
' See Am. Boat Co. v. Commissioner, 583 E3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2009) (the court, in
evaluating applicability of reasonable cause exception under section 6 6 6 4 (c), declined to adopt
a per se rule that would disqualify advice from one who implements a transaction that includes
a potential tax shelter).
no Goldman, 39 E3d at 408.
"'Id.
at 404.
2

11 Id.

"'Id.at 405.
1"Id at 408.
"6 Id. at 404, 408.

17]d
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The rationale for the common law conflict of interest rule, though not
usually articulated in the cases, is that a lawyer free of conflicts of interest is
more likely to give unbiased advice to the client."I Prohibiting reliance on a
conflicted advisor helps ensure that the lawyer's personal interests or interests
to third parties do not diminish the lawyer's duty of undivided loyalty to
the client." 9 Otherwise, the lawyer's judgment could become impaired such
that the conflicted lawyer will either consciously or unconsciously fail "to
consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the
client." 20 A lawyer with something to gain personally may be too tempted to
provide a client biased and unreliable advice if necessary to further the lawyer's own personal interests.' 2 1
B. Potentialfor Advisor Bias
Tax planning is less of a science and more of an art. Creative advisors
exploit complex and detailed tax rules to find unintended loopholes.12 2
Legislative or regulatory fixes to close loopholes add more complexity to the
Code.123 Though it may seem counterintuitive, the detailed rules written by
Congress and the Treasury themselves "might become the source of further

"..
See Rule 1.7 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct, which
generally prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if "there is a significant risk that the
representation ... will be materially limited ... by a personal interest of the lawyer." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2013). Similarly, Rule 102 of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants' (AICPA) Professional Standards requires a CPA to "maintain
objectivity and integrity" and to "be free of conflicts of interest." AICPA PROF 'L STANDARDS

R. 102 (1988); see also Audrey I. Benison, The SophisticatedClient:A Proposalfor the Reconciliation of Conflicts of Interest Standardsfor Attorneys and Accountants, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
699, 700 (2000) ("Conflicts of interest rules are designed to preserve unadulterated decisionmaking by prophylactically restricting conflicted representations."). The Treasury has published regulations that govern individuals who represent taxpayers before the Service in title
31, section 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations and reprinted the regulations as Treasury
Department Circular No. 230 (Circular 230). Circular 230 is administered and enforced by
the Office of Professional Responsibility. Circular 230 echoes the language of the ABA Model
Rules regarding conflicts of interest. 31 C.ER. § 10.29 (2011).
9
' See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1.
20
1 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (2013).
121Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 10 (2013) ("The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have
an adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, if the probity of a lawyer's own
conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer
to give a client detached advice.").
22
1 See William A. Drennan, Strict Liability and Tax Penalties, 62 OKaA. L. REv. 1, 54 n.41
(2009) (quoting David Cay Johnston, The Loophole Artist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at
SM18) ("[The tax planner's] cat-and-mouse game is to work the loopholes in the system until
the government finds them and draws them closed.").
23
1 Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAx REV. 645,
671 (2003).
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24

ambiguity."l Ambiguities in the tax law arising from its complexity make it
easier for advisors to rationalize the result that the client wants.1 25
Adding to the opportunities provided by ambiguity and complexity in the
tax laws, it may be impossible to know for sure whether an advisor is compromised or has simply made one or more errors in judgment in cases where
advice in a tax opinion is later discovered to be incorrect because "[b]ias, by
its very nature, is typically invisible." 2 6 It will often be impossible to tell in
hindsight whether incorrect tax advice is due to the tax advisor's conscious or
unconscious biases or the advisor's intentional actions.1 2 7
Tax advisors are subject to all sorts of biases. For example, they exhibit
confirmation bias, which is the tendency to search for or interpret information that confirms one's perceptions.128 Advisors also exhibit attachment bias,
meaning they have "strong business reasons to remain in clients' good graces
and are thus highly motivated" to reach the result desired by their clients.129
The threat of familiarity posits that closer relationships are more likely to
produce biases than weak or arm's length relationships.' 30
The fact that the client compensates the lawyer for the tax opinion creates the potential for compensation bias. 3' The lawyer wants to deliver the
opinion that the client seeks in order to be compensated for the opinion.
Additionally, a lawyer may be thinking about future opportunities to earn
fees from the client through future engagements. Compensation bias can

24

Id. at 664; see alo Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance andPenalties When the Law Is
Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REv. 241, 247-48 (2007).
'25 Max H. Bazerman et al., Why GoodAccountants Do BadAudits, 80 HARV. Bus. REv. 96,
99 (2002).
126d. at 100 (discussing conflicts of interest of financial auditors).
1

1271d
12sC.

Bryan Cloyd & Brian C. Spilker, Influence of Client Preferences on Tax Professionals'
Search for JudicialPrecedent, 74 AccT. REv. 299, 303 (1999). Cloyd and Spilker used two
studies to show that tax professionals conducting tax research exhibit confirmation bias. The
subjects, who were given a fact pattern and the client's desired outcome, spent more time
searching for cases whose outcome was consistent with client preferences than negative precedents. Moreover, because the subjects emphasized positive precedents, they felt more positive
about the likelihood of success of their client's position, which then caused the subjects to
more strongly recommend client preferences. The subjects in the study were tax professionals
at Big 5 accounting firms, most of whom had master's degrees in taxation but only a small
number of whom were also lawyers. In a different study, the authors found that confirmation
bias was significantly less for law students than accounting students. C. Bryan Cloyd & Brian
C. Spilker, Confirmation Bias in Tax Information Search, 22 J. AM. TAx'N AsS'N 60, 60 (2000).
129 Bazerman et al., supra note 125, at 99.
'Id. at 100 (stating that the longer an advisor serves a client, the more biased his judgment
will tend to be).
131Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 543, 591 (2013) (quoting Neonatology
Assocs., P.A. v. Commissioner, 299 F.3d 221, 234 n.22 (3d Cir. 2002)) (stating that "it is not
immediately evident why a taxpayer should be able to take comfort in the advice of a professional promoting a tax shelter for a fee").
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"nudge [advisors] to shade their views and 'draw more favorable qualitative
conclusions' from their findings than they otherwise would."I 32
Because it is often impossible to determine whether an opinion was affected
by advisor bias, the courts look to various factors as proxies for an advisor's
lack of independence. Factors considered include the length of the relationship between the taxpayer and the advisor, the extent to which an advisor
participated in the transaction, and the impact of certain fee structures.1 33
The paradigmatic example of an advisor's opinion being insufficient to
avoid penalties is where the advisor or the advisor's agent is the promoter of
a mass-marketed tax shelter. The case of 106 Ltd. v. Commissioner is a good
illustration.134 106 Ltd. was a limited partnership that Mr. Palmlund used to
engage in a Son of BOSS transaction (a variation of the Bond and Option
Sales Strategy) using foreign currency options at the urging of his longtime
lawyer Joe Garza.135 Palmlund ran Garza's idea by his long-time accountants
at Turner & Stone and they "gave him the green light, telling him they themselves had used the same transaction" for some of their other clients. 13 6 Garza
also told Palmlund that he had worked with Turner & Stone "on similar
transactions in the past." 1 Garza delivered to Palmlund a "more likely than
not" tax opinion, which Turner & Stone relied on to prepare Palmlund's tax
return.' The Service disallowed the purported $1.0 million loss deduction
generated by the Son of BOSS transaction that flowed through to Palmlund's

13 2

Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 188 (2010)

(quoting Susannah L. Rose et al., Relationships Between Authorship Contributionsand Authors'
Industry FinancialTies Among Oncology Clinical Trials, 28 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1316, 1316
(2010)).
133See, e.g., Stobie Creek Invs. LLC, JFW v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1382-83 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (tying advisors' compensation to "sheltered gain," which along with the advisors'
role in promoting and implementing transaction created an impermissible conflict of interest);
Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States, 822 E Supp. 2d 968, 1015, 1018
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding that advisors "did not have a profit motive or other monetary
interest in the outcome of the transaction because those advisors were paid at an hourly rate ...
regardless of whether [the taxpayers] ultimately engaged in the transaction"); Murfam Farms,
LLC ex rel. Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 247 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (noting that the
"conflict of interest was exacerbated by the fee structure" by which the taxpayers knew that the
advisor would be paid a percentage of the loss desired); Alpha I, L.P v. United States, 93 Fed.
Cl. 280, 317 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (advisor's fees being calculated as a percentage of expected tax
treatment "weighs against the taxpayer's ability to establish a defense of reasonable cause and
good faith"); New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 161, 193 (2009) (holding that a conflict of interest may exist if the advisor "actively participat[es] in the development, structuring, promotion, sale, and implementation" of the transaction being opined on).
'106 Ltd. v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 67 (2011), afd,684 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
135
13

1d. at 70-71.

61d. at 70.
137106 Ltd. v. Commissioner, 684 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2012). In fact, "Garza 'recommended' the transaction to '[m]ore than a dozen' other clients and used a '[v]ery similar'
opinion
letter for each client." Id at 91 (quoting trial transcript).
13 8

106Ltd, 136 T.C. at 72.
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personal tax return and imposed accuracy-related penalties. 1 Palmlund conceded the underlying deficiency but filed suit in the Tax Court as the partnership's tax matters partner to challenge the penalties.o4 0
Both Garza and Turner & Stone were deemed to be promoters whose
advice could not reasonably be relied on.'4 ' The Tax Court defined the term
promoter broadly for purposes of applying the common law conflict of interest rule as "an advisor who participated in structuring the transaction or is
otherwise related to, has an interest in, or profits from the transaction."1 42
Applying that broad definition, the Tax Court observed that:
Garza set up the LLCs, provided a copy of the opinion letter, and coordinated the deal from start to finish. And both Garza and Turner & Stone
profited from selling the transaction to numerous clients. Garza charged a
flat fee for implementing it and wouldn't have been compensated at all if
Palmlund decided not to go through with it. He wasn't being paid to evaluate the deal or tweak a real business deal to increase its tax advantages; he
was being paid to make it happen. And Turner & Stone charged $8,000 for
preparing Palmlund's tax returns-$6,500 more than usual. The extra fees
were not attributable to an extraordinarily complex return ... but, we find,
were the firm's cut for helping to make the deal happen.'
The Tax Court recognized that the promoter definition it adopted is potentially overbroad and could reach even routine tax planning. 144 Consequently,
the court limited its definition to cases "like this one" involving a "tax shelter
offered to numerous parties."14 Thus, 106 Ltd. stands for the proposition
that reliance on "an adviser who participated in structuring . .. or is otherwise related to, has an interest in, or profits from" a marketed tax shelter is
unreasonable. 46
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's
decision.4 7 The appellate court agreed that Palmlund could not reasonably
rely on the advice of Garza or Turner & Stone because "he knew or should
have known that his 'advisors' were not providing independent advice and
that they were in fact promoters of the tax shelter who possessed an inherent conflict of interest."14 The court emphasized that Garza recommended
'1 9Id. at 73.
14ol. at 74. The Service imposed a 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty on the partnership. Id.
1Id
at 80-81; 106Ltd., 684 E3d at 92.
42
1 106Ltd., 136 T.C. at 80 (quoting dictum in Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v. Commissioner,
97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1622, 1634, 2009 TC.M. (RIA) 1 2009-121, at 908).
'43 Id. at 80-81.
'"Id at 80.

Id

45
1

at 79, af'd, 684 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (concluding that the taxpayer could not rely
on "promoters of the transaction. The caselaw [sic] is clear on this point-promoters take the
good-faith out of good-faith reliance").
16Id.

17
1Id.

106 Ltd., 684 E3d at 84.
at 92.
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the Son of BOSS transaction to Palmlund, that Palmlund knew that Garza
was marketing the transaction to other clients, and that Turner & Stone was
essentially Garza's agent. 49
C. Unpredictabilityof Common Law Conflict ofInterest Rule
Application of the common law conflict of interest rule is unpredictable
and inconsistent. An examination of the cases reveals no principled basis for
distinguishing between those permitting reliance on an opinion and those
rejecting reliance due to the advisor's potential or actual conflicts of interest. Additionally, the current approach fails to control for hindsight bias.
The determination of whether accuracy-related penalties may apply is made
only after concluding that the taxpayer underreported its taxes, but it would
be inappropriate if the Service and the courts were biased by the hindsight
knowledge that the taxpayer's tax position had been rejected when evaluating the taxpayer's reasonable cause defense.' Whether the reasonable cause
defense is satisfied should be evaluated in hindsight by recreating the situation the taxpayer and the advisor faced at the time the advice was rendered.'
Yet, when decisions seem results-oriented, the effects of hindsight bias must
be considered.
To illustrate the inconsistency and unpredictability of the common law
conflict of interest analysis, this Part of the Article describes two cases: Canal

Corp. v. Commissionerand American Boat Co., LLC v. United States.
1. Canal
The Tax Court in Canal Corp. v. Commissioner found that "Chesapeake
acted unreasonably in relying on the advice of [its long-standing public
accounting firm and tax return preparer] given the inherent and obvious conflict of interest." 15 2 The Tax Court found that the advisor "crossed the line
from trusted adviser .

.

. to advocate" in what many believe to have been a

legitimate, run-of-the-mill transaction or at least one over which reasonable
minds could disagree.'
Canal involved the imposition of accuracy-related penalties as a result
of a transaction structured as a leveraged partnership that the Tax Court
14Id. at 91.

"s0 SeeJohn C. Anderson et al., The MitigationofHindsightBias in Judges'EvaluationofAuditor Decisions, 16 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 20, 20 (1997).
"'Am. Boat Co. v. Commissioner, 583 E3d 471, 485 (7th Cir. 2009).
52
Canal Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 199, 221 (2010) (citing New Phoenix Sunrise
Corp. v. Commissioner, 132 TC. 161, 192-94 (2009)).
'" Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 220. For critical analysis of the Tax Court's decision, see, among
others, Blake D. Rubin, Andrea Macintosh Whiteway & Jon G. Finkelstein, Tax Court Goes
Overboard in Canal, 130 TAX NOTES (TA) 185 (Jan. 10, 2011); Richard M. Lipton & Todd
D. Golub, The Tax Court Drains Canal Corporation Leveraged Partnership Transaction, 113 J.
TAX'N 340 (2010). See also William P. Bowers & Patrick L. O'Daniel, Send Not to Know for
Whom the Bell Tolls, 13 Bus. ENTITIES 4, 12 (2011) (stating that the case involved a "complicated tax issue" that "was not free from doubt").
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recharacterized as a disguised sale."' Georgia Pacific wanted to acquire
Wisconsin Tissue Mills, Inc. (WISCO) from Chesapeake Corporation,
which changed its name to Canal Corporation in 2009.155 A sale of WISCO
directly to Georgia Pacific was prohibitive, however, because Chesapeake's
low tax basis in WISCO would have resulted in a prohibitively large gain."'
Consequently, Chesapeake and Georgia Pacific agreed to enter into a leveraged partnership whereby WISCO and Georgia Pacific contributed the
assets constituting their tissue businesses to a newly formed limited liability company that was classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes. 5 7
Simultaneously, the LLC made a special cash distribution to WISCO using
the proceeds of a recourse loan that Georgia Pacific guaranteed.'
The contribution of property to a partnership is usually not a taxable transaction."' But when the contribution is made in connection with a distribution from the partnership, the contribution and distribution may instead be
treated as a taxable sale of assets pursuant to the so-called disguised sale rules. 60
The disguised sale rules may be avoided by satisfying the debt-financed distribution exception in Regulation section 1.707-5(b), which excepts debtfinanced distributions for purposes of determining whether a partner receives
money or other consideration for disguised sale purposes to the extent the
distribution does not exceed the distributee partner's allocable share of partnership debt. A partner is allocated a share of partnership recourse debt to the
extent that partner bears the economic risk of loss for the debt in accordance
with the constructive liquidation analysis in Regulation section 1.752-2.161
To have WISCO bear the economic risk of loss and thereby be allocated
the debt, the parties agreed that WISCO would indemnify Georgia Pacific's
guaranty.'62 The indemnity was recommended by Pricewaterhouse Coopers
(PWC), Chesapeake's historic auditor and tax return preparer. 1 63 The taxpayer
and the government disagreed about whether the indemnity was sufficient to
allocate the LLC's debt to WISCO.'" The Tax Court applied the anti-abuse
rule in Regulation section 1.752-2(j) to disregard WISCO's indemnity agreement, concluding that "Chesapeake used the indemnity to create the appearance that WISCO bore the economic -risk of loss for the LLC debt when in
substance the risk was borne by [Georgia Pacific] "165

CanalCorp., 135 T.C. at 217.
' d. at 200 n.2, 203.
1561d
57
' Id. at 203, 207.
58
1d. at 207.
59
' 1.R.C. § 721.
10I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B); Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(1).
15

55

61

1

Reg.

5

162Canal

1.707-5 (b).

Corp., 135 T.C. at 204-05.

'63I. at 204.
'6I. at 212.
'65d. at 216.
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Salomon Smith Barney recommended the leveraged partnership structure.16 6 For an $800,000 fixed fee, PWC negotiated and structured the
transaction, provided tax and accounting advice, and issued a tax opinion
to Chesapeake. 167 The tax opinion concluded that the transaction should be
a tax-free contribution of WISCO's assets to the newly formed LLC rather
than a taxable sale.' Chesapeake conditioned the payment of the fee on
PWC's issuance of the tax opinion by agreeing to pay PWC upon closing and
conditioning the closing on the delivery of a "should" opinion.'16
The government asserted that WISCO's transfer of assets was a dis70
guised sale rather than a tax-free contribution, triggering a tax deficiency.1
Chesapeake filed a petition in the Tax Court to challenge the government's
asserted deficiency."' The government sought accuracy-related penalties in its
amended answer.172 The Tax Court sustained the deficiency and the imposition of penalties.17 1
The taxpayer claimed the reasonable cause defense to attempt to avoid the
imposition of penalties."' But the court found that reliance on PWC's advice
did not warrant the avoidance of penalties because PWC had an inherent
conflict of interest."' The court characterized PWC's role as follows:
We would be hard pressed to identify which of his hats Mr. Miller [the
PWC lawyer who wrote and signed the tax opinion] was wearing in rendering that tax opinion. Mr. Miller not only researched and drafted the tax
opinion, but he also "audited" WISCO's and the LLC's assets to make the
assumptions in the tax opinion. He made legal assumptions separate from
the tax assumptions in the opinion. He reviewed State law to make sure
the assumptions were valid regarding whether a partnership was formed.
In addition, he was intricately involved in drafting the joint venture agreement, the operating agreement and the indemnity agreement. In essence,
Mr. Miller issued an opinion on a transaction he helped plan without the
normal give-and-take in negotiating terms with an outside party.' 6
The decision in Canal is remarkable because it applies the common law
conflict of interest rule in a case involving a nonmarketed tax shelter.'7 There
are several facts that indicate PWC was not a promoter of a tax shelter. First,

'"Id.
at 2 03.
'67 d. at 206.
168I. at 207.
9I. at 206.
"od.at 209-10.
7
'Id. at 210.
172Id.

1 Id. at 216-17, 222.
'Id. at 2 18.
7
1d. at 220-21.
76
' Id. at 220-21.
7
It is important to note that the Tax Court decided Canalbefore 106Ltd. See supra notes
134-149 and accompanying text for discussion of 106Ltd.
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PWC was Chesapeake's long-time tax preparer and auditor.17 Second, there
is no evidence that the transaction in Canal was an off-the-shelf tax shelter
that PWC marketed to its other clients. Third, the transaction in Canalarose
as a result of Chesapeake's decision to sell WISCO's assets that no longer fit
into Chesapeake's strategic plan as compared to Chesapeake selling its tissue
business and then searching for a transaction to shelter gains from the asset
sale.' 7 9 Finally, much of what PWC did that troubled the court is simply
ordinary transactional tax work that should not have drawn the court's wrath.

2. American Boat
Compare the Tax Court's decision in CanalCorp. with the Seventh Circuit's
decision in American Boat.'" The Seventh Circuit in American Boat Co., LLC
v. UnitedStates, held that the reasonable cause exception was satisfied despite
the fact that the advisor who provided the tax opinion also structured and
implemented the transaction, part of which consisted of a mass-marketed
tax shelter.'' David Jump was a businessman who owned a variety of businesses.' 82 In 1996, Jump's banker referred him to Erwin Mayer regarding the
planning of his estate. 8 3 Mayer, an attorney who at the time was at the law
firm Altheimer & Gray, developed an estate plan by "reorganiz[ing] Jump's
operating entities into a number of limited partnerships."' At Mayer's recommendation, Jump engaged in a Son of BOSS transaction to offset gain
triggered from the dissolution of one of Jump's entities."' The Service did
not become aware of the 1996 transaction until after the assessment statute
of limitations expired.'1 6
In 1998, Jump again contacted Mayer, this time as a result of an accident
caused by a towboat owned by one ofJump's companies. 8 7 At Mayer's recommendation, the towboat business was separated from Jump's other companies
by forming American Boat Co., LLC and transferring the towboats from his
other companies to the newly formed LLC. 8 8 For reasons not stated in the
opinion, Jump engaged in another Son of BOSS transaction as part of the
1998 restructuring." 9 Mayer, who by this time had moved his practice to
Jenkens & Gilchrist (J&G), provided Jump with a tax opinion supporting the

"'CanalCorp., 135 T.C at 204.
79
' M at 203 (stating that PWC was hired to "explore strategic alternatives for [WISCO's]
tissue business").
"oAm. Boat Co. v. Commissioner, 583 F3d 471, 483, 486 (7th Cir. 2009).
181

2

18

Id. at 474.

aM The opinion does not explain the relationship, if any, between the banker and Mayer.
18
4
75

at 475.

186MId
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Son of BOSS transaction.o The district court disallowed the losses purportedly resulting from the 1998 transaction but allowed the taxpayer to escape
a 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty, concluding that the reasonable
cause and good faith defense applied. 9'
The government argued that the reasonable cause defense should not apply
with respect to Mayer's advice.192 In the government's view, advice should
be "unreliable as a matter of law" whenever the advisor receives a large fee
for delivering to the client huge tax benefits for relatively little economic
cost.' In effect, the large fee and the favorable tax benefits should have put
the taxpayer on notice that the advice was inherently suspect and unreliable.' The court dismissed this argument.'" The fixed fee did not seem to
trouble the court. In fact, it noted that "one in need of legal advice almost
always has to pay something for it."' 9 6 Additionally, although part of what
Mayer did was implement a tax shelter, that fact did not make reliance on
the J&G tax opinion objectively unreasonable because a "significant" amount
of work was attributable to legitimate tax planning (i.e., restructuring Jump's
businesses).'9'

The court noted that reliance is not reasonable if the advisor is "burdened
with an inherent conflict of interest about which the taxpayer knew or should
have known."' But payment of a large fee for "a large tax benefit at minimal
risk" was not sufficient to create constructive notice.'19 Additionally, Jump
thought he was getting ordinary tax advice, having gone to Mayer seeking
legitimate advice following the towboat accident. 200 Jump "did not know
or have reason to know" that Mayer was marketing the same tax shelter
to others.2 0'
While the Seventh Circuit conceded that there was "merit in some of the
government's arguments," it ultimately concluded that there was "no reversible error."20 2 There are several favorable facts that support the court's decision. First, the advisor was paid a flat fee as opposed to a fee based on the

'Id. at 475-76.
'9 'Id. at 477.
92
1 Id. at 480.
93
1 1d. at 483.
194Id.
195M.

196d.

197Id.
'"Id.at 4 81.
'99Id. at 483.
2001Id at 477, 485 (stating that the district court "found that the shelter was never marketed
to Jump; rather, he sought only expert legal advice, which was what he thought he was paying
for").
2

o'Id. at 477.

202

Id. at 474. Whether reasonable cause exists is a question of fact and thus reversal of the
trial court is appropriate only in instances of clear error. Id. at 483.
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tax savings.20 3 Second, Jump engaged in an earlier Son of BOSS transaction
that the Service did not challenge. 2 0 Third, the advisor did not market the
transaction to Jump. Instead, Jump sought Mayer's advice following the towboat accident. 205 Fourth, the Son of BOSS transaction was part of a larger,
legitimate restructuring. 206 Finally, neither of Jump's accountants raised any
issues relating to the transaction. 207 All of these facts help support the claim
that Jump did not "know or have reason to know" of any conflict of interest
of Mayer.20 8
3. Reconciling American Boat with Canal
Despite their factual similarities, it is difficult to provide a reasonable explanation of why the taxpayer in American Boat was able to rely on a tax opinion to avoid accuracy-related penalties but the taxpayer in Canal was not.
The advisors in both cases had a prior relationship with the taxpayers and
were paid large, flat fees. The advisor in American Boat, but not in Canal,
recommended the transaction to the taxpayer. Both advisors planned and
implemented the transactions. Ironically, had section 6662A been in effect, it
would have applied to the transaction in American Boat because it was a listed
transaction, but would not have applied in Canalbecause the leveraged partnership transaction was neither a listed transaction nor a reportable avoidance
transaction. Consequently, contrary to the actual outcomes, the taxpayer in
American Boat would have been unable to rely on the tax opinion because the
advisor would have been treated as a disqualified tax advisor by organizing,
planning, or implementing the transaction. But the taxpayer in Canalwould
not have been per se precluded from relying on PWC despite PWC's role in
the transaction. Examining certain aspects of these two decisions, including
the fee structure, the relationship between the taxpayer and the advisor, and
the nature of the engagement do not sufficiently explain the inconsistency.
a. Fee Structure. The advisors in both Canaland American Boatwere
paid large, flat fees. The court in Canal was troubled that the fee was not
based on hourly rates and questioned whether the opinion would have been
of better quality if PWC were paid by the hour.20 9 Yet the court in American
Boat was not troubled by the large, flat fee.21 0
Numerous courts have addressed the impact of an advisor's compensation
arrangement on the reasonable cause exception. At one end of the continuum are fees that are computed as a percentage of the tax savings recognized.

203

Id. at 484.

2
4Id.
20 5

at 486.

1d. at 484.
2
"Id.
at 485.
207
1d
2
08

Id.

209

210

Canal Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 199, 219 (2010).

Am. Boat Co., 583 E3d at 483.
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Circular 230 now prohibits such arrangements.211 Similarly, courts repeatedly
have found advisors whose fees are based on a percentage of the tax savings
to have an impermissible conflict of interest. 2 12 At the other end of the continuum are fees based on an advisor's customary hourly rates. The standard
criticism of hourly fees is that they may incentivize professionals to work
inefficiently. Even so, these fee structures should not create an impermissible
conflict of interest in the context of the reasonable cause exception. 213
Lying on the continuum between these two extremes are fixed-fee or flatfee arrangements where the advisor is paid a lump sum amount rather than by
the hour. One criticism of fixed-fee structures is that the quality of the advice
may suffer because advisors who want to boost profits will be incentivized to
spend less time rendering services.214 Despite this theoretical argument, the
Seventh Circuit's decision in American Boat that the reasonable cause exception was satisfied despite the payment of a fixed fee indicates that fixed-fee
arrangements are not per se unreasonable. 21 5 A fixed-fee structure necessitated
by legitimate business needs (e.g., a client desires a predictable amount of
legal fees or wants to manage the overall amount of fees) should be susceptible to less criticism.
More troublesome are fee arrangements that are not only fixed but conditional. Advisors whose payment is contingent on the transaction closing or the
delivery of an opinion with a specified level of confidence have an incentive
C.ER. § 10.27(b)(1), (c) (2011) (defining a contingent fee to include a fee "that is
based on a percentage of the taxes saved" and prohibiting contingent fees except, generally
speaking, in controversy matters).
2 12
Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 E3d 1366, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (tying
advisors' compensation to "sheltered gain," along with advisors' role in promoting and implementing transaction created impermissible conflict of interest); Murfam Farms, LLC ex rel.
Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 247 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (noting that the "conflict of
interest was exacerbated by the fee structure" by which the taxpayers knew that advisor would
be paid a percentage of the loss desired); Alpha I, L.P. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 280, 317
(Fed. Cl. 2010) (advisor's fees calculated as a percentage of expected tax treatment "weighs
against the taxpayer's ability to establish a defense of reasonable cause and good faith"); see also
Am. Boat Co., 583 F.3d at 482 (stating in dicta that "[w]hen an advisor profits considerably
from his participation in the tax shelter, such as where he is compensated through a percentage
of the taxes actually sheltered, a taxpayer is much less reasonable in relying on any advice the
advisor may provide").
213
Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States, 822 F Supp. 2d 968, 1018
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding that advisors "did not have a profit motive or other monetary
interest in the outcome of the transaction because those advisors were paid at an hourly rate
. . . regardless of whether [the taxpayers] ultimately engaged in the transaction"); see also 106
Ltd. v. Commissioner, 136 TC. 67, 79-80 (2011) (citing Countryside Ltd. P'ship. v. Commissioner, 132 TC. 347, 352-55 (2009)) (recognizing that no conflict of interest exists when
the advisor "has no stake in the transaction besides what he bills at his regular hourly rate").
2 14
See Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 219 (criticizing the tax opinion delivered under a contingent
fixed-fee arrangement and stating that "[t]he Court doubts that any firm would have had such
a cavalier approach if the firm was being compensated solely for time devoted to rendering the
opinion").
2 15
Am. Boat Co., 583 E3d at 483.
21131
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to satisfy the condition to ensure they are paid at all. The Tax Court's decision
in Canalis illustrative. The court in Canalfound an impermissible conflict of
interest where the advisor's $800,000 fixed fee was payable only if the transaction actually closed and delivery of the tax opinion was the sole condition to
close.2 1 6 The Tax Court was similarly troubled in 106 Ltd., a case where the
advisor charged a fixed fee that was payable only if the taxpayer decided to go
through with the transaction.21 7
These decisions at least suggest that one should be cautious in structuring fees to advisors that are contingent on the transaction closing. But for
purposes of the heightened reasonable cause exception that applies to section 6662A penalties, an advisor who is not a material advisor will not be a
disqualified advisor even if the advisor's fees are contingent on the closing of
the transaction.21 8 If the heightened reasonable cause exception does not prohibit such fee arrangements then arguably such arrangements should not be
prohibited with respect to transactions that fall outside of section 6662A. 2 1 9

b. Existing Relationshipbetween TaxpayerandAdvisor. In both Canal
and American Boat, the advisor had a previous relationship with the taxpayer.
PWC was Canal's historic auditor and tax return preparer. The advisor in
American Boat had previously advised the taxpayer relating to estate planning issues. The advisor's relationship history seemed to be meaningful to
the court in American Boat but not in Canal even though the relationship
between PWC and Canal was more extensive and sustained. The Tax Court
has emphasized that an advisor's long-standing and ongoing relationship with
a client was a positive factor when evaluating an advisor's independence.22 0
Perhaps this is because a long-time advisor may be more likely to create a
customized transaction rather than pitch a mass-marketed tax shelter. Or perhaps a taxpayer has less reason to be suspicious and more reason to be trustful
of advice from a long-term advisor. On the other hand, psychological research
has shown that longer-term relationships may actually increase the potential
for bias.221

Corp., 135 TC. at 221-22.
106 Ltd., 136 T.C. at 80-81.

216Canal
21

7

21 8

Notice 2005-12, supra note 19 (describing contingent fee arrangements that would constitute a "disqualified compensation arrangement"); see also William P Bowers & Patrick L.
O'Daniel, Send Not to Know for Whom the Bell Tolls, 13 Bus. ENTITIES 4, 16 (2011).
2 19
See also 31 C.F.R. § 10.27(c)(1) (2011) (defining "contingent fee").
2 20

106Ltd., 136 T.C. at 80 (citing Countryside Ltd. P'ship. v. Commissioner, 132 TC. 347,
352-55 (2009)).
221

Seesupra text accompanying note 130. The issue of too cozy a relationship between audi-

tor and audit client is causing the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
to reconsider mandatory firm rotation. PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., CONCEPT
RELEASE ON AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AND AUDIT FImw ROTATION, PCAOB RELEASE No.
2011-006, at 2 (Aug. 16, 2011). The United States House of Representatives recently voted to
prohibit the PCAOB from requiring audit firm rotation. Audit Integrity and Job Protection
Act, H.R. 1564, 113th Cong. (2013).
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c. Nature of the Engagement. The Tax Court in Canalwas troubled
by the fact that PWC negotiated and structured the transaction, provided
tax and accounting advice, and rendered the tax opinion. By contrast, the
Seventh Circuit in American Boat was indifferent to the fact that the advisor who rendered the tax opinion also recommended and implemented the
transaction despite the fact that part of the transaction at issue in American
Boat was a marketed tax shelter. There is nothing inherently suspect about
an advisor who also participates in the structuring and implementation of a
transaction. If, however, the taxpayer knows or has reason to know that the
advisor is promoting the same or similar transaction to others, it is reasonable
to expect the taxpayer to question the credibility of that advice. Reliance on
advice from a promoter may be unreasonable because the economic returns
derived by replicating the same transaction for multiple participants provides greater temptation for compromised judgment as compared to advisors of customized transactions. 222 Permitting reliance on advice in cases
where the taxpayer neither knows nor has reason to know that the advisor
was a promoter, and therefore, burdened by an inherent conflict of interest, is consistent with authorities that evaluate reasonable cause objectively
from the advisee's perspective. 223 As the Tax Court intimated in 106 Ltd. v.
Commissioner, an approach that presumes that taxpayers should question
the credibility of advice simply because it was provided by an advisor who
also somehow participated in the transaction would be impractical and even
unworkable. 224 Additionally, unlike the heightened reasonable cause exception's per se prohibition on interested advisors, reliance on advisors who also
plan and implement transactions should not automatically be prohibited
with respect to transactions that fall outside section 6662A.

2 22

Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and Their Implicationsfor Tax Compliance, 58
AM. U. L. REv. 267, 289 (2008) (stating that "once in place, these abusive tax shelters proved
to be a cash cow because they could easily be replicated for very little costs and with tremendous revenue generation"). While an advisor of a one-off, customized deal who earns a substantial premium may be compromised, a firm is less likely to be impacted economically from
a one-off transaction because it is unlikely to constitute a large percentage of total revenues.
Don A. Moore et al., Auditor Independence, Conflict ofInterest,and the UnconsciousIntrusion of
Bias 8 (Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 02-40, 2002).
22 3
See 106 Ltd. v. Commissioner, 684 E3d 84, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Am. Boat Co.
v. Commissioner, 583 E3d 471, 485 (7th Cir. 2009)); Am. Boat Co., 583 F.3d at 485 (stating
that "the focus is on what [the taxpayer] knew or should have known at the time he obtained
the opinion letter"); Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States, 822 E Supp. 2d
968, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that "[a] taxpayer's claim of reliance upon professional
advice as support for [the reasonable cause] defense is to be evaluated under an objective standard"); Reg. § 1.6664-4.
224
See 106Ltd., 136 T.C. at 80.
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VI. The Current Legislative and Regulatory Framework Is Inadequate
A. Section 6662A Alone Is Insufficient to PoliceFalse Positives and
False Negatives
Despite the unpredictability of the common law conflict of interest rule,
it should not be supplanted by the brighter-line statutory conflict of interest rule that applies to section 6662A penalties. Several deficiencies that are
discussed below call into question the efficacy of the statutory conflict of
interest rule.
1. PurportedJustifcationfor the HeightenedReasonable Cause Exception
Section 6662A is intended "to deter taxpayers from entering into tax avoidance transactions" by imposing potentially harsher penalties and a more stringent reasonable cause exception. 2 25 Section 6662A imposes a 30% penalty
in connection with listed transactions and reportable avoidance transactions
that are not disclosed, which is steeper than the usual 20% accuracy-related
penalty. 22 6 Additionally, taxpayers are categorically prohibited from relying
on interested advisors to satisfy the reasonable cause and good faith exception that applies to section 66662A penalties. 2 2 7 And no reasonable cause
exception is available for taxpayers who fail to disclose transactions subject to

section 6662A. 22 8
Prohibiting taxpayers from relying on disqualified tax advisors seems justified with respect to marketed tax shelter opinions from promoters or their
agents that have proven to be unreliable during the last tax-shelter wave. 22 9
Tempted by the potential fees to be earned, advisors in those kinds of situations may be more likely to reach for the desired conclusion by over-zealously
interpreting existing authority, something other, more reasonable, advisors
may be unwilling to do. Additionally, the more aggressive a transaction, the
greater the likelihood taxpayers will be required to disclose their participation
to the Service. 230 Disclosure increases the likelihood that the Service will question, and possibly, disallow the tax benefits of transactions, which heightens
the mutuality of interests between a taxpayer and an advisor who marketed
the transaction. The mutuality of interests between client and advisor creates
a greater risk that the advisor's independence will be impaired to the extent
the advisor acts more as an advocate and less as an impartial advisor.
It makes sense that opinions from tax shelter promoters would present such an unacceptable risk to the advisors' independence to be deemed

225

H.R. REP. No. 108-548 pt. 1, at 263 (2004).
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
227
See supra note 80-81 and accompanying text.
228
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
22 9
0ne need only look to the government's success at litigating tax shelter cases for confirmation that opinions have often failed to protect taxpayers from penalties.
23 0
Reg. §§ 1.6011-4(a), -4(d).
22 6
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statutorily unreliable.2 3' But Congress and Treasury have expanded section
6662A beyond promoters to include advisors who merely draft transaction
documents. As discussed below, this expansion is more difficult to justify and
interferes with the typical role of tax planning advisors.2 32

2. Section 6662A Is Under-Inclusive
Section 6662A penalties may be imposed with respect to listed transactions
and other reportable transactions with a significant tax avoidance purpose.
Exempting nonreportable, nonsignificant purpose transactions and reportable transactions other than listed transactions with no significant avoidance
purpose from the reach of the heightened reasonable cause exception is supportable. Nonreportable, nonsignificant purpose transactions include routine, run-of-the-mill, nonsuspect transactions so the more lenient exception
applies to those types of transactions. Reportable transactions are transactions
that must be disclosed to the Service because they have one or more characteristics that the Service has determined are present in abusive transactions. 2 34
But if reportable transactions have no significant tax avoidance purpose, there
would seem to be less reason to subject them to the heightened reasonable
cause exception. 2 35
Section 6662A may not, however, go far enough because it does not apply
to nonreportable transactions that nonetheless have a significant tax avoidance purpose. For example, section 6662A would not apply to transactions
like the leveraged partnership structure in Canalbecause that transaction was
neither a listed nor a reportable transaction. Yet some commentators found
Canalto be abusive. 2 36
Although section 6662A is under-inclusive in the sense that there may be
transactions other than listed transactions and reportable avoidance transactions that are nonetheless tax avoidance transactions, the approach Congress
took likely was intentional. Had Congress not limited section 6662A to
reportable transactions but instead applied it to all significant avoidance
transactions whether or not they are reportable, section 6662A could sweep
in legitimate transactions if "a significant purpose" is interpreted broadly to
231 But it is not evident that opinion counsel will necessarily suffer from fewer
conflicts and
be more independent than promoters who help market the transactions at issue. David M.
Schizer, Enlistingthe Tax Bar, 59 TAx L. REV. 331, 364-66 (2006).
232
See infa notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
233
1.R.C. § 6662A(b)(2).
234
Reg. %§1.6011-4(a), -4(d).
235No accuracy penalty is imposed with regard to these types of transactions if the taxpayer
discloses the relevant facts of the transaction and has reasonable basis for the position on the
return. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii). Additionally, these types of transactions qualify for the
more lenient reasonable cause exception that generally does not require any disclosure or minimum level of confidence in the position. I.R.C. § 666 4 (c).
236See, e.g., David Michaels, Canal Chaos:In Reality No Substance, 2012 TAX NOTEs TODAY

216-9 (Nov. 7, 2012); Amy S. Elliott, PractitionersDiscuss How Canal Crossed the Leveraged
PartnershipLine, 2011 TAx NOTES TODAY 64-2 (Apr. 4, 2011).
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include any transaction with a plan to reduce tax. 2 37 The Code provides no
guidance as to what "a significant purpose" is despite calls from professional
organizations for Congress or the Service to do so. 2 3 8 Limiting the applicability of section 6662A and its more stringent reasonable cause exception to
reportable transactions adds at least some dimension of predictability.

3. DefinitionalComplexity in Section 6662A
Despite the bright line that Congress drew in section 6662A by requiring
reliance on disinterested advisors to avoid section 6662A penalties, it may
be sub-optimal because it is paired with a vague and undefined "significant
2 37

See

PUB.

Co.

ACCOUNTING

OVERSIGHT BD.,

ETHICS AND

INDEPENDENCE RULES

PCAOB RELEASE
2005-014, at 27 (July 26, 2005) (discussing Rule 3522(b), which prohibits public accounting
firms from providing nonaudit services relating to aggressive tax position transactions, which
are defined to be transactions with a significant purpose of tax avoidance, and stating that the
Board intends for the threshold as to what constitutes "a significant purpose" to be low); see also
Weisbach & Gale, supra note 8, at 1286 (recommending that advisors may want to follow the
covered opinion rules in most cases due to their uncertain scope); Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice
Before the Return: The Casefor Raising Standardsand DenyingEvidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX
REV. 583, 624 (2006) (stating that "the use of significant tax avoidance to define the scope of
covered transactions suggests that the Circular 230 standards could cover almost any transaction that provides a substantial tax benefit"); Rothman, supra note 34, at 334 (stating that "[a]s
a practical matter, in the author's experience, most practitioners do not spend a lot of time or
energy trying to figure out what significant purpose means for purposes of the Circular 230
written advice rules . . . . Instead, it is generally taken for granted that the term is so vague that
we do not really know what it means and that any transaction might be considered to have a
significant purpose").
238Both the American Bar Association and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants have called on the Service to define more clearly, and provide guidance regarding reportable avoidance transactions. Alan R. Einhorn, AICPA Callsfor Reform of Civil Tax
Penalty System, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 166-76 (Aug. 31, 2009); Stuart M. Lewis, ABA Tax
Section Recommends Overhaulof Tax Penalty Regime, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 75-25 (Apr. 22,
2009). The covered opinion rules of Circular 230 use both "a significant purpose" standard
and "the principal purpose" standard, but only "the principal purpose" is defined. 31 C.F.R. §
10.35(b)(10) (2011) (defining "the principal purpose" for the covered opinion rules to mean a
purpose that "exceeds any other purpose"). Transactions entered into without any nontax business purpose or with little or no motive for economic gain are necessarily significant purpose
transactions. See Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 E Supp. 2d 122, 201 (D.
Conn. 2004); Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.M (CCH) 1157, 2005
TC.M. (RIA) 1 2005-104. But even a transaction supported by nontax business purposes,
economic substance, or both may have a significant tax avoidance purpose. See 31 C.ER.
§ 10.35(b)(10) (2011) (stating that "A partnership, entity, plan or arrangement may have a
significant purpose of avoidance or evasion even though it does not have the principal purpose
of avoidance or evasion"); Valero Energy Corp. v. United States, No. 06 C 6730, 2008 WL
4104368, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2008) (stating that section 6662(d)(2)(C) does not require
that the "underlying transaction [lack] economic reality or [be] driven solely or primarily by
tax-avoidance concerns"). See generally Nathan W Giesselman, A Significant Problem Defining
a 'SignifcantPurpose'and the Significant Difficulties That Result, 111 TAX NOTES (TA) 1119,
1130 (June 5, 2006) (suggests scrapping the significant purpose test in Circular 230, finding
it unworkable).
CONCERNING INDEPENDENCE, TAX SERVICES, AND CONTINGENT FEES,
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purpose" standard. The Service may be hesitant to impose section 6662A
penalties because the government bears the burden of production in any
court proceeding with respect to an individual's liability for penalties. 2 39 The
burden of production would require the government to come forward with
evidence showing that the transaction is a reportable avoidance transaction,
whereas the government's burden under section 6662 is a simple, mechanical
one. 240 Even in cases where the government does not bear the initial burden
of production, taxpayers and the government will have to contend with the
definitional complexity in section 6662A from the use of the "significant purpose" language that is absent in section 6662.
Since their enactment in 2004, section 6662A penalties have only infrequently been litigated, and all the reported cases involve undisclosed listed
transactions. 241 The government's burden was made easy in those cases because
it did not have to contend with the significant purpose standard, which is relevant for reportable avoidance transactions, but not listed transactions. 24 2 All
the reported cases involve listed transactions, which are transactions that are
the same or substantially similar to transactions that the Service identifies in
published guidance to be abusive. 24 3 Furthermore, the penalty is one of strict
liability because the reasonable cause exception is inapplicable to transactions
that are not disclosed.2 44
Of course, litigated cases do not paint the whole picture because the
Service may impose section 6662A penalties that taxpayers concede or otherwise settle. Congress, in an off-Code provision, directed the Service to begin
providing the congressional tax writing committees an annual report beginning no later than the end of 2010 of the penalties assessed under section
6662A.245 Such a report may prove helpful in assessing the effectiveness of
section 6662A. 24 6 If, on the whole, section 6662A is not enforced or is applied
only to listed transactions, the common law conflict of interest rule will be
of greater significance because other types of potentially abusive transactions
239
1.R.C.
24

1l.R.C.

§ 7491(c).
§ 6662(d)(1)(A). A penalty applies under section 6662 to an understatement that

is substantial, which for noncorporate taxpayers is defined to mean an understatement that
exceeds the greater of (1) 10% of the correct tax required to be shown on the return or (2)
$5,000. § 6662(d)(1)(A).
241
See, e.g., Soni v. Commissioner, 105 TC.M. (CCH) 1216, 2013 T.C.M. (RIA) 1 201330; Repetto v. Commissioner, 103 TC.M. (CCH) 1895, 2012 TC.M. (RIA) 2012-168;
Brennan v. Commissioner, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 534, 2011 T.C.M. (RIA) 2011-276; McGehee Family Clinic v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 227, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2010-202.
2 42
See I.R.C. § 6662A(b)(2)(B).
243
Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (defining "listed transaction").
2 44
I.R.C § 6664(d)(3).
2 45
Small BusinessJobsAct of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, § 2103, 124 Stat. 2504, 2564. An
off-Code provision is one that is enacted by Congress and thus, is included in the public law
but not included in the Code. See, e.g., Christopher H. Hanna, The Magic in the Tax Legislative
Process, 59 SMU L. REv. 649, 658 (2006).
2 46
The author was unable to locate these annual reports.
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would, as a practical matter, be excluded from the scope of the statutory conflict of interest rule that applies to section 6662A penalties.
B. Advisor Penalties
Taxpayers untrained in tax law should not be held accountable for advisors'
faulty legal analysis if the flaws are not apparent. The overarching question
should be whether there is anything in the opinion itself or the circumstances
surrounding its preparation that would alert a reasonable person that the
opinion is flawed in such a way as to make reliance on the opinion unreasonable. Instead, advisors should be responsible for the quality of their legal
advice. An advisor who advances untenable legal arguments could be held
accountable through ethical standards, and it is reasonable for taxpayers to
assume that advisers will abide by their ethical and fiduciary obligations. 24 7
Malpractice suits may also help to hold advisors accountable.2 48
Additionally, more attention should be given to constraining advisors
through the imposition of penalties. 249 Tax return preparers are subject to
penalties under section 6694 for preparing tax returns with understatements
of tax liability based on a position lacking substantial authority or a reasonable basis for adequately disclosed positions. 250 Tax shelters and reportable
transactions require a confidence level of more likely than not to avoid preparer penalties.251 Importantly, the penalty may be imposed only if the preparer knew or should have known of the unreasonable return position. 252 The
amount of the penalty under section 6694 is the greater of $1,000 or 50%
of the tax return preparer's fees with respect to the return. 2 53 Even if preparer
penalties may otherwise apply, a preparer may avoid penalties by satisfying
a reasonable cause and good faith exception.254 Prior to its amendment in
2007, section 6694 was largely irrelevant because the amount of the penalty
was a mere $250, and no penalty would be imposed for positions with at least
a realistic possibility of success.255
247
See
248

Klein v. United States, 94 E Supp. 2d 838, 850 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
See Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and Their Implicationsfor Tax Compliance,
58 Am. U. L. REv. 267, 284-85 (2008) (finding that malpractice litigation has been effective at
curbing abusive behavior of practitioners); Weisbach & Gale, supra note 8, at 1295 (discussing
the increase in state malpractice suits against tax advisors).
249
See generally Weisbach & Gale, supra note 8 (providing a survey of the rules regulating
tax advice and tax advisors); see also Mark P. Gergen, Third Party Opinionsas a Toolfor Enforcing Tax Law 3 (Univ. of Penn. Law Sch. Ctr. for Tax Law & Pol'y, 2008) (stating that "[i]t is
common knowledge that tax opinions and appraisals tend to be biased in favor of a taxpayer
who pays for the opinion except when the opinion supplier has a substantial risk of liability to
others if the opinion is erroneous").
250
I.R.C. § 6694(a)(2)(A)-(B).
251§ 6694(a)(2)(C).
252§ 6694(a)(1)(B).
253§ 669 4 (a).
254§ 669 4 (a)(3).
4
255§ 669 (a) (2006), amendedbyPub. L. No. 110-28, § 8246(b), 121 Stat. 112,203 (2007).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 67, No. 3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3437851

438

SECTION OF TAXATION

The term "tax return preparer" is defined in section 7701(a) (36) to mean
any person who prepares all or substantially all of a tax return for compensation.2 56 Those subject to tax return preparer penalties include practitioners who sign clients' returns and nonsigning tax return preparers, but only
for advice provided "with respect to events that have occurred at the time
2 7
Thus, the tax return preparer penalties in section
the advice is rendered."m
6694 provide no deterrent effect for practitioners who provide tax planning
advice regarding prospective transactions. 25 8 A robust debate should be had
about whether tax planning advisors should be subjected to section 6694
penalties.2 59
Tax planning advisors potentially are subject to penalties other than those
under section 6694. Section 6700 imposes a penalty on those who organize
or sell abusive tax shelters and section 6701 imposes a penalty for aiding and
abetting an understatement of tax. But both of those sections impose relatively trivial penalties of only $1,000. Section 6700(a) was amended in 2004
to impose a penalty equal to 50% of the fees of a person who organizes or participates in the sale of a transaction if that person makes a statement regarding
the tax consequences of the transaction and the person knows or should have
known that the statement is false or fraudulent as to a material matter. There
are no reported cases imposing the stiffer penalty. Under section 6701, if the
tax liability relates to a corporation, the amount of the penalty is $10,000.260
C. Effect ofEliminating Circular230 Covered Opinion Rules
Treasury is authorized to regulate individuals who represent taxpayers
before the Service.2 61 Pursuant to that authority, Treasury has published regulations governing practice before the Service in title 31, section 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, and reprinted the regulations as Circular 230.
To combat tax shelter activity that was proliferating in the late 1990s,
Treasury issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in 2000 to seek
input regarding standards of practice for advice relating to corporate tax
shelters.262 That process culminated in December 2004 when the final covered opinion rules were incorporated into Circular 230.263 Covered opinions
256
1.R.C. § 7701(a)(36)(A).
257
Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(2)(i).
258
Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(2), Ex.
259

(2).
Some justify excluding advisors who engage in tax planning from section 6694 penalties
based on congressional intent. See N.Y. State Bar Assoc., Report on the Definition of'Tax Return
Preparer'and Other Issues Under Code Sections 6694, 6695, and 7701(a)(36), 2007 TAX NOTES
TODAY 247-51 (Dec. 20, 2007) (positing that Congress never intended section 6694 to cover
"pure advisors" who give legal advice without discussing or seeing the return and that including
them within the scope of section 6694 would be unworkable).
2
6I.R.C. § 6701(b)(2).
26131 U.S.C. § 330 (2006).
262Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 65 Fed. Reg.
30375-01 (proposed May 11, 2000).
26 3
T.D. 9165, 2005-1 C.B. 357 (promulgating Circular 230, 31 C.ER. § 10.35 (2004)).
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include written tax advice regarding abusive transactions, which for this purpose includes listed transactions and transactions with the principal purpose
of tax avoidance or evasion. 264 Covered opinions also include transactions
with a significant purpose of tax evasion or avoidance if, among other things,
the opinion reaches a confidence level of at least more likely than not on one
or more significant federal tax issues and is intended for penalty protection
(i.e., a reliance opinion) or "will be used or referred to by a person other than
the practitioner .

.

. in promoting, marketing or recommending" a transac-

tion to one or more taxpayers (i.e., a marketed opinion). 265
The covered opinion rules are unpopular among practitioners not only
because of the complexity of the covered opinion definition but because of
the onerous requirements imposed by the covered opinion rules in section
10.35. Section 10.35 requires practitioners to include in the opinion itself a
description of all the relevant facts, all factual assumptions and factual representations relied on, the legal analysis, and an overall conclusion as to the
likelihood that the advice is the proper treatment.2 " Depending on the scope
of the engagement, these requirements may be unwarranted and excessive.
These requirements naturally will increase the cost of legal advice for what
amounts to a full-blown legal opinion, something that clients may not always
want or need.
In September 2012, Treasury and the Service proposed replacing the mechanistic covered opinion rules with "streamlined standards" that would apply
to all types of written advice, having concluded that the covered opinion rules
were "overbroad, difficult to apply, and do not necessarily produce higher
quality tax advice."2 67 Revision of the rules is appropriate because the high
cost of practitioner compliance far outweighs the minimal benefit to taxpayers who receive covered opinions. 26 8
If finalized in their current form, the proposed regulations would eliminate the covered opinion concept, including the burdensome and formalistic
requirements that turned all written advice into exhaustive legal opinions. 2 69
Instead, those who provide written tax advice would be required to:
(i) Base the written advice on reasonable factual and legal assumptions
(including assumptions as to future events);
26431
26531

C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(A), (B) (2011).
C.ER. § 10.35(b)(5).

A Federal tax issue is significant if the Internal Revenue Service has a reasonable basis
for a successful challenge and its resolution could have a significant impact, whether
beneficial or adverse and under any reasonably foreseeable circumstance, on the overall Federal tax treatment of the transaction(s) or matter(s) addressed in the opinion.
31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(3).
26631 C.ER. § 10.35(c).
2671Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue
Service, 77 Fed. Reg.
57,055, 57,057 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 31 C.ER. pt. 10).
2

68

See id. at 57,056-57.
1d. at 57,057.

269
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(ii) Reasonably consider all relevant facts that the practitioner knows or
should know;
(iii) Use reasonable efforts to identify and ascertain the facts relevant to
written advice on each Federal tax matter;
(iv) Not rely upon representations, statements, findings, or agreements
(including projections, financial forecasts, or appraisals) of the taxpayer or
any other person if reliance on them would be unreasonable; and
(v) Not, in evaluating a Federal tax matter, take into account the possibility that a tax return will not be audited or that a matter will not be raised
on audit.270
In evaluating compliance with these principles, the government "will apply a
reasonableness standard, considering all facts and circumstances, including,
but not limited to, the scope of the engagement and the type and specificity
of the advice sought by the client."2 7 ' A heightened standard of review would
apply to opinions that will be used or referred to by someone other than the
practitioner to promote, market, or recommend a transaction with a significant purpose of tax avoidance or evasion (i.e., marketed opinions). 2 72
\While practitioners and professional associations generally welcome the
proposed changes, it remains to be seen whether they will be more effective than the current rules in helping to depress the bad behavior of practitioners. 2 73 Apparently, no one has ever been disciplined under the current
covered opinion rules, at least not publicly, since their adoption several years
ago. 274 Eliminating the covered opinion concept in favor of standards that
apply to all written advice is a good first step towards creating workable standards of conduct that may actually be enforced. 2 7 The current rules in section 10.35 are applicable only if the written advice is a covered opinion,
which may depend on technical and vague conceptual determinations such

27 0

Prop. Reg. § 10.37(a)(2), 31 C.ER. 57,055, 57,061 (2012).
Prop. Reg. § 10.37(c)(1), 31 C.ER. 57,055, 57,062 (2012). Nearly identical language
is included in current section 10.37(a), which pertains to written advice other than covered
opinions. 31 C.FR. § 10.37(a) (2011).
272
Prop. Reg. § 10.37(c)(2), 31 C.ER. 57,055, 57,062 (2012). Identical language is
included in current section 10.37(a), which pertains to written advice other than covered
opinions. 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(a).
273See, e.g., Andrew W Needham, New York State Bar Association Tax Section Report on Proposed Amendments to Circular230 Relating to Standards With Respect to Written Tax Advice,
2012 TAX NOTES TODAY 248-27 (Dec. 26, 2012); Rudolph R. Ramelli, ABA Section ofTaxation
Comments on ProposedReg-138367-06 Relating to PracticeBefore the Internal Revenue Service,
2012 TAx NoTEs ToDAY 229-26 (Nov. 28, 2012).
274
Ramelli, supra note 273.
275
See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 77 Fed. Reg.
57,055, 57,057 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 31 C.ER. pt. 10); Prop. Reg.
§ 10.37(a)(1), 77 Fed. Reg. 57,055, 57,061 (2012).
27 1
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as whether tax avoidance is the principal purpose or a significant purpose. 2 76
The preamble to the proposed regulations recognizes that "there is no direct
evidence to suggest that the overly-technical and detailed requirements of
current § 10.35 were responsible for, or particularly effective at, curtailing
the behavior of individuals attempting to profit from promoting frivolous
transactions or transactions without a reasonable basis." 2 77 Stripping away
the complex covered opinion determinations may make enforcement easier
because the government will not need to show as a threshold matter that
the written advice constitutes a covered opinion. Moreover, the requirements
in the proposed regulations are described in broad strokes without a lot of
details. 2 78 For example, written advice cannot rely on unreasonable representations based on a reasonableness standard, taking into account all the facts
and circumstances. 2 79 A potentially wider range of conduct may fit within that
standard than if the standard had been written as a more specific rule. 28 0 The
Service's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), which is responsible
for enforcing Circular 230, could use the imprecision of the standards to the
government's benefit when enforcing the provisions by broadly interpreting
their requirements. On the other hand, taxpayers might use the principlesbased approach to their advantage, particularly if the lack of specificity gives
more discretion to practitioners.
Determining whether a principles-based approach over a rules-based
approach will itself produce more ethical behavior is beyond the scope of this
Article. To be sure, eliminating the complexity of the covered opinion analysis will make it easier for OPR to enforce the provisions. But the prescriptions
and prohibitions, such as using reasonable efforts to ascertain the relevant
facts and the prohibition against unreasonable assumptions, are essentially
the same as in the current rules. 2 81 Whether the same standards, stripped of
the covered opinion provisions and various requirements that dictated the
form of the written advice, will be effective to curtail bad behavior remains to
be seen. 28 2 Simply going from an overly detailed and formulistic approach to
an overly vague one may not be the answer. At least with respect to written
2

76

See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 77 Fed. Reg.
at 57,056-57 (describing the effort required to determine whether written advice is a covered
opinion).
2 77

7

Id. at 57,057.

2 8

See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text for list of requirements for written advice
in the proposed regulations.
279
Prop. Reg. §§ 10.37(a)(2)(iv), (c)(1), 77 Fed. Reg. 57,055, 57,061-62 (2012).
280
Ramelli, supra note 273.
28
1Compare Prop. Reg. §§ 10.37(a)(2), 77 Fed. Reg. 57,055, 57,061-62 (2012), with 31
C.F.R. §§ 10.35(c), 10.37(a) (2011).
282
See, e.g., Ramelli, supra note 273. The ABA, in its comments to the proposed changes
to Circular 230, commended the Treasury and the Service for the proposed changes but recommended the addition of examples applying the provisions in Proposed Regulation section
10.37 to specific fact situations out of concern that the proposed changes "may not give OPR
an adequate tool for addressing problematic written advice practices." Id.
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tax advice intended for penalty protection, it may be worthwhile to have a
separate set of rules that provides more specifics.

D. Efect of High Scienter Requirements in Circular230
Despite the proposed elimination of the overly technical covered opinion
rules, little may change as a practical matter due to the high level of scienter required to trigger sanctions under Circular 230.283 Under both the current and proposed regulations, a practitioner may be sanctioned for violating
the written advice regulations willfully, recklessly, or through gross incompetence. 284 Reckless conduct is defined as a "highly unreasonable omission
or misrepresentation involving an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care that a practitioner should observe under the circumstances." 28 5
Gross incompetence "includes conduct that reflects gross indifference, preparation which is grossly inadequate under the circumstances, and a consistent failure to perform obligations to the client."28 6 Practitioners can also be
sanctioned for incompetence and disreputable conduct, which includes giving a false opinion knowingly, recklessly, or through gross incompetence, or
"engaging in a pattern of providing incompetent opinions." 287 False opinions
include those which
reflect or result from a knowing misstatement of fact or law, from an assertion of a position known to be unwarranted under existing law, from
counseling or assisting in conduct known to be illegal or fraudulent, from
concealing matters required by law to be revealed, or from consciously disregarding information indicating that material facts expressed in the opinion or offering material are false or misleading. 288
The types of possible sanctions include censure, suspension or disbarment
from practice before the Service, and monetary penalties. 289
The proposed regulations do not amend the level of scienter.29 0 Thus, those
high scienter requirements that make enforcement of Circular 230 remote
will remain if the proposed amendments are finalized. It is reasonable to suppose that the imprecision of the proposed regulations coupled with the high
scienter requirements may deter OPR from enforcing the provisions at all,
making the imprecise standards of conduct nothing more than mere aspirational platitudes. Reducing the level of scienter may not be justified, however.
Psychological literature indicates that biased information processing is mostly

283

Gergen, supra note 249, at 12.
See 31 C.F.R. § 10.52(a) (2011); Prop. Reg. § 10.52(a), 77 Fed. Reg. 57,055, 57,062
(2012).
28531 C.F.R. § 10.51(a)(13).
28
6Id.
I
10.51(a)(13).
287 d
288 d
289Id.
10.50.
290
See 2012-40 I.R.B. 433.
28 4
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29

unconscious and unintentional. ' To the extent tax opinions are erroneous
due to unconscious bias, discipline, including penalties, will not be an effective deterrent.2 92

VII. Hold Advisors Accountable for Conflicts of Interest
This Part of the Article explores possible ways to lessen the courts' reliance
on the common law conflict of interest rule by bringing front-of-mind awareness to advisor conflicts of interest.

A. Expand the Reach of Section 6662A
Applying section 6662A and the heightened reasonable cause exception to
all reportable transactions whether or not they are significant purpose transactions could eliminate the definitional complexity and under-inclusiveness
of section 6662A. 293 Reportable transactions are broad categories of transactions that the Service has identified as susceptible to abuse so much so that
participation in reportable transactions must be disclosed to the Service. 2 94
But imposing the heightened reasonable cause exception to all reportable
transactions may be excessive because reportable transactions (other than
listed transactions) are only potentially abusive.
On the other hand, expanding section 6662A and the heightened reasonable cause exception to all reportable transactions would be beneficial to prevent conflicts of interest from arising in the first place without requiring any
substantive assessment of the advisor's behavior.2 95 The heightened reasonable
cause exception that applies to section 6662A penalties would be applied ex
ante and involve less complex determinations ex post.
If the reach of section 6662A were expanded to all reportable transactions, scaling back the disqualified tax advisor definition would be desirable.
Otherwise, a taxpayer may be precluded from relying on an advisor who
291

See Bazerman et al., supra note 125, at 97-98; Moore et al., supra note 222, at 4; Gergen,
supra note 249, at 6-7.
292
azerman et al., supra note 125, at 101-02.
293
See supra notes 233-46 and accompanying text.
29
' See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
295
Professor Samuel Issacharoff classifies regulatory responses to conflicts of interest between
principals and agents, including lawyers and their clients, into three categories: (1) substantive
regulations, (2) liability rules, or (3) procedural regulations. Samuel Issacharoff, LegalResponses
to Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BusiNEsS, LAw, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLY, 189, 191-200 (Don A. Moore, Daylian M. Cain,
George Loewenstein & Max H. Bazerman eds., 2005). Substantive regulations are rules that
are applied ex ante to "regulate the substantive range of choices available to [a lawyer]" by prohibiting specific substantive decisions. Id. at 191. Like substantive regulations, liability rules
are intended to prohibit behavior but liability rules are applied ex post. Id. at 192. Liability
rules include civil and criminal penalties. The third category is procedural regulations, which
are enforced ex ante by restricting the role of the lawyer to remove obvious conflicts of interest.
Professor Issacharoff declares there to be "something distinct ... about conflicts of interest that
makes them relatively immune to substantive or liability based regimes," and finds procedural
regulations superior to the other classes of legal responses. Id. at 201.
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engages in routine tax planning. The reasonable cause exception that applies
to section 6662A is restrictive in the sense that a taxpayer seeking to show
a reasonable belief that the tax treatment is more likely than not correct by
relying on professional advice must seek out an advisor who is not a disqualified tax advisor within the meaning of section 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii). The term
disqualified tax advisor is defined in the Code to include a material advisor
who "participates in the organization, management, promotion, or sale of the
transaction. . . .1296 Pending the issuance of regulations, the Service has issued
interim guidance that defines the meaning of a disqualified tax advisor very
broadly.29 7 For example, a material advisor participates in the organization
of a transaction if the advisor "devises, creates, investigates or initiates the
transaction or tax strategy" or "performs acts relating to the development or
establishment of the transaction," including the preparation of documents
that "establish the structure used in connection with the transaction....
The legislative history supports the Service's interpretation of the statute. In
particular, the House Report accompanying the enactment of section 6662A
provides that:
A material advisor is considered as participating in the "organization" of
a transaction if the advisor performs acts relating to the development of
the transaction. This may include, for example, preparing documents (1)
establishing a structure used in connection with the transaction (such as a
partnership agreement), (2) describing the transaction (such as an offering
memorandum or other statement describing the transaction), or (3) relating
to the registration of the transaction with any federal, state or local government body.299
Advisors are disqualified only if they are "material advisors," which are those
earning at least $50,000 for advice provided to individuals and $250,000 for
all other taxpayers. 300 For listed transactions, the dollar thresholds are reduced
to $10,000 for individuals and $25,000 for other taxpayers.301 These dollar
thresholds could be used to filter the transactions subject to section 6662A
even if the provision were expanded to all reportable transactions.
B. Conflicts of Interest in Circular230
Neither the current nor proposed provisions of Circular 230 provide sufficient guidance regarding either a practitioner's conflict of interest or the
potential effect such a conflict may have on advice provided to a taxpayer.
The covered opinion rules of Circular 230 require covered opinions to disclose referral agreements between the practitioner and a promoter and
296

I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii)(I).

2 97

Notice 2005-12, supra note 19.

29

8d

29

9H.R. REP. No. 108-548, pt. 1, at 265 (2004).
I.R.C. 5§ 6111(b)(1)(B), 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii)(I).
30 1
Reg. § 301.6111-3(b)(3)(i)(B).
30 0
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compensation arrangements between the practitioner and any person with
respect to promoting, marketing, or recommending the plan that is the subject of the opinion.3 02 The proposed regulations, however, do not incorporate
these conflict of interest disclosures.
Beyond disclosures of conflicts solely due to compensation arrangements
or referral agreements, Treasury and the Service should delineate the sorts
of conflicting interests that cause concern. Consideration should be given
to providing specific factors that should be taken into account to determine
whether an impermissible conflict exists. The Tax Court in Countryside Ltd.
Partnershipv. Commissioner clarified that a tax advisor is not a promoter of
a tax shelter within the meaning of the tax practitioner privilege in section
7525 when all of the following circumstances exist:
* The advisor has a long-standing and ongoing relationship with the client;
* The advisor does not give unsolicited advice;
* The advice is a regular part of the advisor's practice (i.e., it is routine advice);
* The advisor does not use generic prototypes that would indicate
canned transactions;
* The advisor is paid by the hour and does not receive fixed fees or fees
that are a percentage of tax savings; and
* The advisor has no stake in the transaction besides what he bills at his
regular hourly rate.3 0 3
The Countryside factors could be used as a way to draw boundaries regarding the types of permissible and prohibited relationships. These factors should
not, however, be adopted in their entirety without further reflection. As discussed elsewhere, psychological research has shown that longer-term relationships may actually increase the potential for bias. 3" If that is the case, the fact
that an advisor has a long-standing and ongoing relationship with the client
may be a risk factor rather than a guideline indicating no significant conflict
of interest. Additionally, the larger the financial gain may be more important than whether the advisor is paid by the hour versus on a flat-fee basis.
In addition to providing greater guidance for advisors, including more specific conflict of interest provisions in Circular 230 may provide a mechanism
for enforcement against a noncomplying advisor, though the high scienter
requirements in Circular 230 could be a barrier.305
30231 C.F.R. § 10.35(e)(1) (2011).
303106 Ltd. v. Commissioner, 136 TC. 67, 80 (2011) (citing Countryside Ltd. P'ship. v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. 347, 352-55 (2009)).
304
See Bazerman et al., supra note 125 and accompanying text; see also U.S. INSTITUTE OF
MED., COMM. ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MED. RESEARCH, EDuc., AND PRACTICE,
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 24 (Bernard Lo
& Marilyn J. Field, eds., 2009).
3 5
See supra notes 283-92 and accompanying text.
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Finally, section 10.29(b)(3) of Circular 230, which is carried over in the
proposed regulations, requires practitioners to obtain their clients' written
informed consent if there is a significant risk that the representation will be
materially limited by a personal interest of the practitioner. 306 One weakness of the required disclosure is that it does not require that the client be
informed of the consequences of the conflict. Advisors should be required
to identify, evaluate, and address in writing threats to independence, particularly if written advice will be used for penalty protection. They should
also be required to disclose the effects a conflict could have on the efficacy of
any advice provided, including the risk that an advisor's conflict of interest
may prevent the client from relying on professional advice for penalty protection. 307 Requiring practitioners to disclose potential conflicts may make them
more aware of their potential for bias and even deter them from situations
that create potential conflicts of interest. 30s

C. Elevate Objectivity over Advocacy
Lawyers represent clients in a variety of roles, including as advocates
who "zealously assert[] the client's position under the rules of the adversary
system." 309 Indeed, the traditional approach to legal ethics contemplates lawyers acting as advocates "to help the client win by creatively arguing that
the client has complied with law or has a stronger case than the opposing

3

o'There has been at least one reported case of OPR sanctioning a lawyer for not disclosing
conflicts with respect to the lawyer's "multiple adverse representations" and personal interests.
IR-News Rel. 2012-63, 2012 WL 6554676, at *1 (June 22, 2012). The lawyer wrote tax
opinions for several prospective participants of a benefit plan under section 419A while also
representing the promoter of the plan. Id. The lawyer consented to censure, which means that
his name, city and state of practice, and disciplinary sanction are published in the Internal
Revenue Bulletin. Id.; see also Announcement 2012-33, 2012-35 I.R.B. 327.
07
Proposed section 10.29(c) of Circular 230 provided that:
A practitioner may not represent a party in his or her practice before the Internal
Revenue Service if the representation of the party may be materially limited by the
practitioner's own interests, unless the practitioner reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents after the practitioner has
fully disclosed the potential conflict, including disclosure of the implications of the
potential conflict and the risks involved.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AND NOTICE OF PuBLIc
HEARING. But this proposal was not ultimately adopted. See TD. 9011, 2002-33 I.R.B. 356.
30

sSee Christopher Tarver Robertson, BiasedAdvice, 60 EMORY L.J. 653, 680 (2011).

09

3 MODEL RULES OF PROF 'L CONDUCT: PREAMBLE AND SCOPE (2013). Though the professional standards that govern CPAs are generally outside the scope of this Article, see Am. INST.
OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, INTERPRETATION 102-6 (2011) (requiring a CPA to main-

tain objectivity even when performing tax engagements that involve acting as an advocate).
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party." A lawyer may also act as an advisor. Whereas an advocate typically
deals with already established facts, the legal advisor helps shape the facts by
advising as to conduct that has yet to occur. In contrast to a zealous advocate
whose job is to make the strongest legal arguments possible in favor of the
client, the goal of a legal advisor is "to accurately predict" the outcome of an
assumed set of facts.3 1 2 To provide an accurate "opinion as to what the ultimate decisions of the court would be as to the applicable law," a legal advisor
should objectively determine the applicable law and impartially apply the law
to the anticipated facts.313
Lawyers providing tax opinions should not use the creative lawyering often
valued in traditional advocacy.314 Too often lawyers see their role as helping
clients get what they want and finding a loophole to do it as opposed to
advising their clients as to the likely consequences of future conduct and the
concomitant risks. The Restatement of Law Governing Lauyers provides that
"a lawyer's duty to third-party-opinion recipients 'is to provide a fair and
objective opinion." 3 15 Tax opinions technically are not third-party opinions
to the extent they are not provided to third parties but are only for the client's benefit. But because the consequences of transactions opined on affect
the tax system more generally, it may be helpful to analogize tax opinions to
third-party legal opinions.
Treasury and the Service should consider adding a provision to Circular
230 to emphasize the need for advisors providing tax advice to be objective and impartial. While such an approach is perhaps implicit in the provisions that prohibit unreasonable legal assumptions and that require a more
likely than not opinion, it is worth making explicit the obligation to engage
in objective, detached legal analysis. One approach would be to expressly
require an evaluation of all relevant authorities, including contrary authorities, to determine whether sufficient authority exists to justify the opinion

3 10
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lauyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84
TEX. L. REV. 1, 26 (2005).
"'MODEL RULES OF PROF 'L CONDUCT, supra note 309. A lawyer who promotes illegal
tax shelters may be acting outside of the roles of both advisor and advocate in an altogether
different category that David Luban has termed "the Lawyer as Absolver" or the "Lawyer as
Indulgence Seller." David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, in THE TORTURE
DEBATE IN AMERICA 35, 70-71 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006).
3 12
Schwarcz, supra note 310, at 27.
3 13
Richard W Jennings, The Corporate Lawyers Responsibilities and Liabilities in Pending
Legal Opinions, 30 Bus. LAw. 73, 75 (1975).
3 14
Schwarcz, supra note 310, at 27 (stating that "[tiechnical accuracy must be valued more
than creativity, and indeed creativity that undermines accuracy must be eschewed").
315
Id. at 48 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §95 cmt.
c (2000)).
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being rendered.31 6 Another approach would be to add a more general statement to clarify that an advisor issuing penalty protection tax opinions has a
duty to be impartial and objective. 3 17
Critics may argue that a rule emphasizing the advisor's independent role
will have no practical effect because such a provision is not readily enforceable
in the absence of any clear demarcation between advocacy and independence.
Nonetheless, incorporating a provision into Circular 230 would stress the
tax advisors' independent role, and could also be referred to by advisors to
keep at bay overly aggressive clients. These "normative benefit[s] . .. could be
substantial, notwithstanding potential difficulties relating to enforcement.""1 8
D. Evaluate Reasonable Causefrom the Taxpayer's Perspective
Tax advice used to satisfy either reasonable cause exception must (1) be
grounded on all relevant facts and the law that pertains to those facts, and (2)
not rely on unreasonable or inaccurate factual or legal assumptions or unreasonable representations.3 1 9 These requirements are better suited for inclusion in Circular 230, which regulates the conduct of advisors who practice
before the Service. A taxpayer's reasonable cause defense should not be made
to depend on variables that are outside the taxpayer's actual or constructive
knowledge.3 20 Conditioning a taxpayer's reasonable cause defense on the legal
assumptions underlying the advice being reasonable is inappropriate unless
the taxpayer knows or should know that the legal assumptions are unrea316

See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i) (regulation addressing whether substantial authority exists).
The regulation provides that: "There is substantial authority for the tax treatment of an item
only if the weight of the authorities supporting the treatment is substantial in relation to the
weight of authorities supporting contrary treatment. All authorities relevant to the tax treatment of an item, including the authorities contrary to the treatment, are taken into account
in determining whether substantial authority exists. The weight of authorities is determined in
light of the pertinent facts and circumstances in the manner prescribed by paragraph (d)(3) (ii)
of this section." Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i).
317
See H.K. WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON
THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALEs (July 1996), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/sec3c.htm. The report recommended reforms to the English Civil Procedure Rules. One reform requires that expert
witnesses be impartial and that their duty to the court override their duty to their clients.
Additionally, experts would be required to include a statement in their reports declaring their
understanding that their "primary duty is to the court, both in preparing his report and in
giving evidence." Id.
"'Steven Feola & Richard A. Alcorn, Expert Witness Advocacy: Changing Its Culture, 45
ARIz. ATT'Y 24, 28 (2009).
319
1.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(iii) (reasonable cause exception applicable to section 6662A penalties); Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (for more lenient reasonable cause exception).
320AS the ABA Section of Taxation aptly said in its comments to the most recent amendments to Circular 230, "taxpayers [should] not be held responsible for practice standard shortcomings in their advisors' work that they did not know of, or have reason to know of." Am.
BAR Ass'N. SECTION OF TAXATION, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REc-138367-06 RELATING TO
PRACTICE BEFORE THE INTERNAL REVENUE
NOTES TODAY 229-26 (Nov. 28, 2012).

SERVICE (Nov. 27, 2012), reprinted in 2012 TAX
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sonable. Similarly, ensuring that the advisor is provided with necessary and
accurate information should be the responsibility of advisors to ask the right
questions to solicit the necessary information rather than conditioning the
taxpayer's reasonable cause defense on whether the taxpayer provided necessary and accurate information to the advisor. 321

E. Referrals to OPR Where Reasonable CauseException Not Met
Opinion writers should be referred to OPR if a deficiency is sustained
and penalties are imposed on a taxpayer who relied on professional advice.
The imposition of a deficiency means that the advice underlying the opinion
turned out to be incorrect. While OPR should not second-guess the underlying analysis except to the extent it bears on the advisor's competence, the
imposition of penalties means that the taxpayer could not show that reliance
on the advice obtained was reasonable cause for the inaccuracy and that the
taxpayer acted in good faith by relying on the advice despite the inaccuracy.
OPR should, in hindsight, determine whether the advisor complied with the
advisor's professional obligations as described in Circular 230. Appropriate
areas of inquiry could include determining whether the professional was
competent, whether any impermissible conflicts of interest existed that may
have affected the advisor's ability to give objective advice, and the sufficiency
of due diligence conducted given the nature of the relationship with the client, the client's sophistication, and all other facts and circumstances.

E Penalties
As discussed in Part VI.B., the current penalty regime is insufficient to deter
tax planning advisors. For liability rules to effectively deter lawyer behavior,
however, the risk of potential future punishment has to outweigh the certainty of present benefits.3 22 As Professor Issacharoff notes, lawyers "may tend
to overdiscount the likelihood of eventual punishment, thus undermining
the deterrent function of the prescribed penalty." 32 3 But the real threat of
penalties is one way to align the interests of advisors to their clients' interests.
Putting real teeth into advisor penalties is imperative, particularly because
reliance only on Circular 230 or other professional standards and ethics to
police advisors are unlikely to be successful. 324
321

See Rawls Trading LP et al. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 732, 740, 2012 T.C.M.
(RIA) 1 2012-340, at 2460 (quoting Longoria v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 11, 2009
TC.M. (RIA) 2009-162 for the proposition that it is the advisor's job to solicit the necessary
information from the taxpayer).
322
lssacharoff, supra note 295, at 194.
323
]d
324
N.Y. STATE BAR Assoc. TAX SECTION, REPORT ON CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS (Apr. 23,
1999), reprintedin 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 82-29 (Apr. 29, 1999) (stating that "[blecause ...
the application of standards of practice to individual cases inevitably involves difficult questions of judgment, we do not believe that the corporate tax shelter phenomenon can readily
be addressed simply through enforcing professional standards and ethics more vigorously").
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VIII. Conclusion
Taxpayers may avoid accuracy-related penalties by relying on professional
tax advice to satisfy the reasonable cause defense. Reliance on professional tax
advice is not, however, a fail-safe escape from penalties. Courts have repeatedly held that taxpayers "cannot reasonably rely for professional advice on
someone they know to be burdened with an inherent conflict of interest."
But courts have not clearly articulated the circumstances under which the
common law conflict of interest rule applies, making its application unpredictable and inconsistent. Despite the statutory conflict of interest rule in
section 6662(d) that applies to section 6662A penalties, tax return preparer
penalties, and the covered opinion rules in Circular 230, the common law
conflict of interest rule remains relevant due to several deficiencies. In addition to highlighting the deficiencies in these statutory and legislative provisions, this Article explores analytical approaches with the potential to lessen
the courts' reliance on the common law conflict of interest rule by bringing
front-of-mind awareness to advisor conflicts of interest.
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